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Abstract
Since information asymmetries have been identi¯ed as an important source of bank
pro¯ts, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing arrangements such
as credit registers and bureaus will lead to lower investment in acquiring information.
However, banks base their decisions on both hard and soft information, and it is only
the former type of data that can be communicated credibly. We show that hard and
soft information are strategic substitutes, and that when hard information is shared,
banks will invest more in soft information. This can potentially lead to more accurate
lending decisions and favor small, informationally opaque borrowers. Higher invest-
ment in soft technology o®ers important implications for borrower switching. We test
our theory using ¯rm-level data from 24 countries. 1
Keywords: Bank competition, credit bureaus, hard information, soft information
JEL classi¯cation numbers: G21, L13
1We would like to thank Efraim Benmelech, Lamont Black, Christian Ewerhart, Michel Habib, Oliver
Hart, Lars Norden, Jeremy Stein, as well as seminar participants at the Symposium of Economic Analy-
sis (2008), Harvard Organizational Economics Seminar(2008), Washington Finance Association(2008) and
Corporate Finance Day in Neuchatel (2007) for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.
11 Introduction
Information is a crucial input in the banking industry. When making lending deci-
sion, banks have to know their potential borrowers well, and this requires a signi¯cant
investment in screening and monitoring. At the same time, collecting useful unique
information about borrowers provides a competitive advantage and a source of pro¯ts
over the lifetime of the banking relationship. Under asymmetric information borrowers
will ¯nd it di±cult to switch from their incumbent bank to its competitors (Sharpe
1990, Von Thadden 2004), and incumbents are therefore able to appropriate monopo-
listic rents.
Recent developments in technology and information sharing institutions provide
possibilities for the exchange of information between banks. When information is
shared through an information exchange institution, such as credit bureaus and public
credit registers, the higher competition drives down interest rates (Brown, Jappelli
and Pagano 2007, Jappeli and Pagano 1993, Love and Mylenko 2003), and reduces
bene¯ts derived from otherwise monopolistic information. As a result, it is natural to
think that banks will lose their incentives to acquire information on their borrowers.
If this scenario is true, and incentives to invest in information do indeed go down, this
may lead to less accurate lending decisions and challenge the usefulness of information
sharing arrangements.
The growth of credit bureaus and credit registers therefore poses important ques-
tions that we address in the paper. As banks share information, how will the incumbent
bank's incentives to acquire information change? Will the incumbent make more or
less accurate credit decisions by investing more or less in acquiring information about
its borrowers?
We provide answers to those questions starting from an important distinction be-
tween di®erent types of information. In their attempt to mitigate informational asym-
metries, banks acquire two types of information: hard information, which can be easily
reduced to a numerical entry and transmitted credibly (credit history, balance sheet
data, amount borrowed), and soft information, which is di±cult to summarize in a nu-
meric score (judgement, opinions, notes...), and hard to communicate (Petersen 2004,
Petersen and Rajan 2002, Stein 2000, Berger et al 2002).2
Thus, we rephrase the questions above: As bank pro¯ts are competed away due
2As Petersen (2004), Petersen and Rajan (1994) point out, banks collect information which is nether
initially available in hard numbers nor easily or accurately reducible to a numerical score. Once the rela-
tionship is established, even then this information isn't hard. The ¯rm is still unable to communicate this
(relationship) information to the broader lending markets. One can \create an index of honesty for one to
ten. This in and of itself does not make the information hard. It must be that my interpretation of a three
on this index is the same as yours". Petersen (2004) o®ers the example of the relationship based on a loan
o±cer as a typical one. The loan o±cer has a long history with the borrower and based on a multitude of
personal contacts has built up an impression of the borrower's honesty, credit worthiness, and likelihood to
defaulting. Based on this view of the borrower and the loan o±cer's experience, the loan can be approved
or denied.
2to information sharing, how do banks' incentives to acquire soft information change?
Will they invest more or less in soft information?
We ¯rst answer this question theoretically. We model bank competition with and
without hard information sharing. Banks acquire soft information by investing in
monitoring their borrowers during the lifetime of the loan.3 As they invest in soft
information, they di®erentiate borrowers based on two di®erent sources of information
that they use for second-period lending: hard information that can be shared, and soft
information that cannot be communicated credibly.
We show that lenders will have higher incentives to collect costly soft informa-
tion when hard information is shared, and this may well improve lending decisions.
When hard information is not shared, the incumbent lenders' informational advantage
is based on both hard and soft data. In contrast, when hard information is shared,
bank pro¯ts are based only on soft information. The marginal bene¯t from investing
in soft information is higher in the presence of credit bureaus or registers. Banks com-
pensate for the loss of one source of informational rents by investing in the alternative,
remaining source.
We conclude that the concern that information sharing will destroy information
acquisition seems largely unfounded. Indeed, the overall investment in information
may well increase and this can lead to better capital allocation and increased welfare.
Moreover, as information becomes available to competitors, it seems reasonable
that switching will increase and interest rates decrease. Our model suggests that the
answer to both issues depends on the type of signal resulting from monitoring. Good-
signal borrowers receive lower interest rates, while bad-signal borrowers are o®ered
higher interest rates by their incumbent banks. Under information sharing, good-
signal borrowers are less likely to switch banks, while bad-signal borrowers are more
likely to switch. Faced with higher adverse selection problems, uninformed banks may
well increase interest rates.
We test the implications of our model empirically, using data on ¯rms and infor-
mation sharing arrangements from 24 transition countries. We analyze the impact of
introducing private credit bureaus and public credit registries, that share hard informa-
tion, on the lenders' incentives to invest in soft, proprietary information. Speci¯cally,
we test whether soft information acquisition is higher in countries where hard infor-
mation is shared. We ¯nd statistically strong results supporting the hypothesis, using
several measures of soft information acquisition. The e®ects are economically large.
As predicted by our theoretical part, we also ¯nd that under hard information
sharing switching is lower when produced signals are good and it is higher when signals
are bad.
The magnitude of the investment in soft information acquisition (and, therefore,
3We have also done the analysis of the game under ex-ante screening, but do not present screening results
in the paper for brevity. The expressions are less tractable, however the numerical solutions point to similar
results as in the case of monitoring.
3the resulting borrower switching or staying with the bank) depends on the level of
asymmetric information that it is supposed to overcome; if there is no asymmetric
information, there is no payo® to the investment. This may generate a di®ering impact
on di®erent ¯rm sizes: information about small ¯rms from public sources is scarce, as
most of them do not have audited ¯nancial statements, are not rated by rating agencies,
and therefore information asymmetries are most acute for small ¯rms (Petersen and
Rajan 2004). In the theoretical chapter, we obtain that optimal investment in soft
information increases in asymmetric information, suggesting that our results should
be stronger for small ¯rms. We look at the di®erences between small and large ¯rms
in our sample and do indeed ¯nd a stronger impact of information sharing in the case
of small, presumably more opaque ¯rms.
Our ¯ndings have policy implications. As standard hard information is shared,
banks will choose higher investment in the acquisition of soft information, and this
can improve lending decisions. Thus, the establishment of a public register or a credit
bureau will improve the allocation of capital and bene¯t the more creditworthy bor-
rowers.
Our theory also provides implications for bank supervision. The new Basel Accord
provides banks with the possibility to use internal assessment of risk (the Internal
ratings-based approach to credit risk). Since hard information sharing implies more
investment in soft information, small banks which specialize more in small loans (Berger
et al 2002) based on soft information, should be given more room for internal risk
assessment, than large, distant-lending banks.
In summary, we present the results in three steps in theory: we ¯rst derive the equi-
librium of the banking competition with and without information sharing (subsection
2.1). We then look at interest rates and switching under information sharing, and show
that with increasing level in soft information, the resulting switching and the expected
level of interest rates will vary depending on the outcome of soft information (section
2.2). Finally, and most importantly, we show that investment in soft information in-
creases when hard information is shared (2.3). Section 3 describes data and empirical
predictions. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We model the interaction between banks and borrowers over two periods. At the
starting point, banks do not have information about the quality of potential borrowers.
During the lending relationship banks acquire both hard (default)4 and soft informa-
tion. At the end of the ¯rst round of lending, each bank has acquired soft information
about its own borrowers and also knows whether they have managed to repay their
4We use default information here, since it is the most basic type of hard information and also the most
commonly shared. Hard information can also obviously be any type of veri¯able information that can be
shared by means of a credit bureau.
4loans.
Without information sharing, both types of information are unavailable to com-
petitors and increase the informational rents incumbent banks are able to extract from
their borrowers during the second period. When information is shared, the success or
default of each borrower becomes known to all banks. The soft information, however,
cannot be shared and continues to generate a competitive advantage for incumbent
banks.
In what follows we show that banks will invest more in acquiring soft information
when default information is shared. This is because, without information sharing,
default information is an additional source of bank rents, and the marginal bene¯t from
investing in soft information is lower. With the credit bureau, however, banks have
to rely on soft information as the main source of their pro¯ts. The higher resulting
investment in information means that interest rates and lending decisions are more
likely to re°ect the true quality of each borrower.
2.1 The Setup
We have two banks and a continuum of borrowers with a total mass of 1. Each
borrower has an investment project that requires $I, which they borrow from one of
the two banks.
There are two types of borrowers:
² High-type borrowers represent a proportion ¸ in the overall population. They
have a probability pH of producing R, and a probability 1 ¡ pH of producing 0.
² Low-type borrowers represent a proportion 1¡¸ in the overall population. They
have a probability pL (pL < pH) of producing R, and a probability 1 ¡ pL of
producing 0.
The proportions of borrowers and the success probabilities are common knowledge.
Borrowers live for two periods, with identical (and independent) projects and no initial
funds in both periods. As in Von Thadden (2004), borrowers do not know their own
types. We assume both types are creditworthy (pHR ¡ I > pLR ¡ I > 0).5
At the beginning of the ¯rst period, without any previous contact with the potential
customers, banks do not know the borrowers' types. As a result, they o®er the same
interest rate to all applicants. During the ¯rst period, however, banks can acquire
information about their borrowers by monitoring them. The monitoring process
begins after the ¯rst period loans have been extended. It results in a signal ´ of
borrowers' types. The quality of the signal is given by ':
5We make this assumption for ease of exposition, but the extension to the case where low-type borrowers
are not creditworthy is straightforward. We discuss this below.




Pr(´ = Hjtype = L) = Pr(´ = Ljtype = H) = 1 ¡ ':
Thus, at the end of the ¯rst period banks have two types of information about their
borrowers:
² the signal generated by monitoring;
² the repayment history - i.e., whether borrowers have defaulted or not.
The signal is costly: getting a signal of quality ' requires an outlay of c(' ¡ 1
2)2.
As a result, banks have to decide how much to invest in the monitoring technology.
The default information and the information resulting from monitoring can be used by
banks to update their estimate of the borrowers' types and adjust their interest rates
for the second period.
We assume that the outcome of the monitoring process is \soft" information - mean-
ing that it is di±cult to communicate credibly between banks. Default information, in
contrast, is veri¯able and has no such problems. As a result, a credit bureau will only
be able to collect and share the latter type of information, and each bank will know
which of the other bank's initial customers has defaulted. Without a credit bureau,
both default and monitoring information are only available to incumbent banks.
At the end of the ¯rst period, banks know both the results of their monitoring and
the success or default of each of their own borrowers. As a result, they can distinguish
between four types among their ¯rst-period customers:
² borrowers that have defaulted and have also generated a bad signal when moni-
tored;
² borrowers that have defaulted, but have generated a good signal when monitored;
² borrowers that have not defaulted, but generated a bad signal when monitored;
² borrowers that have not defaulted and have also generated a good signal when
monitored.
The ¯rst type is obviously the least likely to produce a positive return in the second
period, while the last one is the most likely to be successful.
In the next two subsections we describe the equilibrium strategies of the incumbent
and outside bank under information sharing, and no information sharing, respectively.
We assume the absence of binding long-term contracts. As shown in Sharpe (1990), this
absence is the interesting case to consider, since otherwise the analysis would reduce
to standard competitive pricing and ignore the evolution of banking relationships over
time (see also von Thadden 2004).
62.1.1 Default information is shared
We start with the case where information is shared in the economy. The actions
taken by the banks and borrowers are outlined below.
The timing of the game
T = 1
² Banks announce one term lending rates and compete µ a la Bertrand
² The ¯rm chooses one bank and invests I, the market is shared equally.
² Banks invest in monitoring.
² Borrowers repay whenever they can do so.
T = 2
² Banks share payment/default history (hard information).
² Simultaneously the inside (¯rst-period, incumbent) and the outside banks o®er
second period interest rates. Each bank has two types of information about
its ¯rst period borrowers, and has received default information concerning its
competitor's borrowers.
² The ¯rm chooses an o®er and invests I. If indi®erent, the ¯rm stays with the
inside bank.
² Borrowers repay/ do not repay their loans and this determines the banks' pro¯ts.
Lending Competition
If default information is shared, each bank knows which borrowers have been suc-
cessful in the ¯rst period, regardless of whether it has had a lending relationship with
them or not. Moreover, within the defaulting/successful subgroups the incumbent
bank can distinguish between good- and bad-signal borrowers.
Based on this acquired information and the initial data on the population, banks
are able to update borrowers' success probabilities and use them to determine their
interest rates. Both banks can condition their rates on default information, but only
the incumbent bank can also use the soft information to di®erentiate the interest rates
that it o®ers to its ¯rst-period borrowers.
Banks move simultaneously to bid second period interest rates, and do not observe
each other's rates. They do not know the borrowers' types, but know the initial pro-
portion of the types, and each type's success probabilities. As showed in von Thadden
(2004), there is no pure strategy equilibrium in simultaneous-bid games where one
lender knows more than the other. This is a known result from the literature on auc-
tions (Milgrom and Weber 1982). There is however a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
7which banks randomize over intervals of interest rates. The second period of the game
thus has a mixed-strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
While the mechanics of the model is not as simple as in the case of a hypothetical
pure-strategy equilibrium in which borrowers never switch to less-informed banks, the
model intuition described above is arguably realistic. Ioannidou and Ongena (2008)
present empirical evidence that is consistent with the idea of incumbents accumulating
informational rents and borrowers occasionally switching banks as a result of excessive
interest rates.
Proposition 2.1 There is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous game.
Proof See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The uninformed bank is afraid
of overpaying at any interest rate, since the informed bank can always pick the higher-
quality borrowers.
If either bank bids above the break-even interest rate for the bad type, then the
other bank can always undercut and still make a positive pro¯t. This means that
above that rate banks will compete µ a la Bertrand and no bids will be made in that
region in equilibrium. At the same time, the outside bank will not make bids below the
break-even rate for the average borrower (whether good or bad), because otherwise it
would make an expected loss. The incumbent bank will therefore also avoid that lower
region, since bidding there would bring it low pro¯ts for no good reason. Thus the
bids of both banks can only be between the break-even interest rate for the average
borrower and the break-even interest rate for the worst type.
Suppose now that the incumbent bank chooses a given interest rate in that interval.
The outside bank can then bid a slightly lower interest rate and capture the whole
market, while making positive pro¯ts (we are above the break-even rate for the average
borrower). Conversely, suppose the outside bank chooses a given interest rate. Then
the incumbent bank can bid a slightly lower interest rate, serve just the good types,
and the outside bank ends up making losses. We have therefore no pure-strategy
equilibrium.
As shown in von Thadden (2004), however, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in which both banks compete for borrowers. Both banks will choose interest rates over
the interval between the break-even rate for the average borrower and the break-even
interest rate for the the worst type. The mixed strategies will de described by the prob-
abilities of choosing various interest rates within that interval. The incumbent bank
will choose di®erent rates for the good- and bad-signal borrowers, while the outside
bank is unable to make that distinction. Both banks can distinguish between default-
ing and non-defaulting borrowers, so we can think of the competition between the
two banks as taking place on two separate markets (for defaulting and non-defaulting
borrowers respectively).
8Let FK
u (r) denote the bidding strategy of the outside (uninformed) bank. The
cumulative density function FK
u (r) gives the probability that the uninformed bank
chooses an interest rate less or equal to r for defaulting (K = D) and non-defaulting
(K = N) borrowers respectively. FJ
i (r) describes the bidding strategies for the in-
formed bank for the good-signal, defaulting (J = GD), bad-signal, defaulting(J =
BD), good-signal, non-defaulting (J = GN) and bad-signal, defaulting borrowers
(J = BN).
For a given chosen interest rate for a given group, the informed bank will make
a pro¯t provided it has not been undercut by the competing bank. Thus the pro¯t
functions for the four types can be expressed as follows:
¼GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FN
u (r))
¼GD
i (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FD
u (r))
¼BN
i (r) = NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FN
u (r))
¼BD
i (r) = NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FD
u (r))
The outside bank's pro¯ts on the two types it can distinguish (defaulters and non-
defaulters) will be:
¼D
u (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGD
i (r)) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FBD
i (r));
¼N
u (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGN
i (r)) + NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FBN
i (r)):
The proportions of the groups are a function of the monitoring intensity ' and are
given by:
NGN = ¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL;
NBN = ¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL;
NGD = ¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL);
NBD = ¸(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'(1 ¡ pL);
NN = NGN + NBN = ¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL;
ND = NGD + NBD = ¸(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL);
1 = NN + ND:
The Bayesian updated probabilities of success are given by:
9pGN =
¸'p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')p2
L




H + (1 ¡ ¸)'p2
L
¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL
;
pGD =
¸'pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
;
pBD =
¸(1 ¡ ')pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'(1 ¡ pL)
four the four types, and
pN =
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
pD =
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)
;
p = ¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL:
for non-defaulting, defaulting and the overall universe of borrowers respectively.
One would expect from Bayesian rules that better types have higher updated proba-
bilities. Indeed, observe that pGN ¸ pN ¸ pBN, pGD ¸ pD ¸ pBD, pN > p > pD (since
pH > pL, and ' ¸ 0:5). The respective break-even gross interest rate for each of the
groups is equal to the investment I divided by the respective probability, rK = I
pK,
for K = D;N;GN;GD;BN;or BD, while for the overall population it is equal to
r = I
p = I
¸pH+(1¡¸)pL. The break-even interest rates will obviously be lower for better
types.
Proposition 2.2 Equilibrium Strategy The competition between the incumbent and
the outside bank has a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the informed
bank bids
FGN
i (r) = 1 ¡
NBN(I ¡ pBN¹ rN)
NGN(pGNr ¡ I)
;FGD
i (r) = 1 ¡
NBD(I ¡ pBD¹ rD)
NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
where FGN
i is de¯ned on [rN;rBN] and FGD
i on [rD;rBD]. It bids the break-even
interest rate rBD for the bad-signal, defaulting group, and rBN for the bad-signal, non-
defaulting group.
The uninformed bank bids
FN




u (r) = 1 ¡
pGDrD ¡ I
pGDr ¡ I
on [rN;rBN) and FGD
i on [rD;rBD) respectively, with an atom at rBD and rBN, re-
10spectively.
Proof See Appendix.
The informed bank will only bid the break-even rate for bad-signal borrowers,
since otherwise it would be making an expected loss. It will choose interest rates from
the interval [¹ rK; ¹ rBK] (K = N;D) for good-signal borrowers. In a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, the bank has to be indi®erent between the interest rates in that interval.
This means that pro¯ts have to be the same for various interest rates and equal to the
pro¯ts for rate ¹ rK (K = N;D):
NGK(pGK¹ rK ¡ I) = NGK(pGKr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FK
u (r)) = constant
(we have that 1 ¡ FK
u (¹ rK) = 1 since the uninformed bank starts bidding from ¹ rK).
This gives us the expression for FK
u : FK
u = 1 ¡
pGKbarrN¡I
pGKr¡I .
As highlighted above, the uninformed bank cannot di®erentiate between good- and
bad-signal borrowers. It chooses interest rates from the interval [¹ rK; ¹ rBK] (K = N;D)
and has to make the same pro¯ts by picking any of those interest rates in equilibrium.
On [¹ rK; ¹ rBK) this implies
NGK(pGKr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGK
i (r))+NBK(pBKr ¡ I) = NGK(pGK¹ rBK ¡ I)£
£(1 ¡ FGK
i (¹ rBK)) + NBK(pBK¹ rBK ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGK
i (¹ rBK)) = 0
since all of the informed bank's bids are lower or equal to ¹ rBK, (only equal in the case
of bad-signal borrowers). Solving, we get that FGK
i = 1 ¡
NBK(I¡pBKr)
NGN(pGKr¡I).
The proposition establishes an intuitive result that will hold throughout the anal-
ysis: better types receive better interest rates (from the incumbent), where better is
measured by a favorable hard or soft information. Indeed, let's look at the non-
defaulter N market separately. The bad signals in this market get rBN, which is at
least as high as what the good signals get [rN;rBN]. The same is true for D history.
At the same time, for a given signal, better hard information guarantees better rates,
since rN < rD;rBN < rBD, so that the non-defaulters do better by getting rates in
[rN;rBN], with an identical distribution as defaulters do in [rD;rBD].
The incumbent bank will make positive pro¯ts on good-signal borrowers, and zero
pro¯ts on bad-signal borrowers, that will always be charged their break-even inter-
est rate. Uninformed banks will make zero pro¯ts, but they will sometimes get the
good-signal borrowers. The incumbent bank's total pro¯ts can therefore be written as
the sum of two positive terms (pro¯ts on good-signal, non-defaulting and defaulting
borrowers respectively):
¼share = NGN(pGNrN ¡ I) + NGD(pGDrD ¡ I) (1)
11Plugging in the expressions for the numbers of borrowers, success probabilities and
break-even interest rates we get the following result.
Proposition 2.3 The expected gross pro¯ts for the incumbent bank when default in-
formation is shared is given by
¼share = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(2' ¡ 1)(pH ¡ pL)
h pHpL
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
i
Proof See Appendix.
Gross pro¯ts are linearly increasing in '. Net pro¯ts can be obtained by subtracting
the cost of monitoring c(' ¡ 1
2)2: ¼
share, net
i = ¼share ¡ c(' ¡ 1
2)2.
2.1.2 No information is shared
We describe now the case where there is no credit bureau in the economy. At the
beginning of the second period,both default and monitoring information are known
only to the incumbent bank. The second period timing is:
T = 2
² Banks do not share hard information.
² Simultaneously the inside and the outside banks o®er second period interest rates.
Each bank has four types of information about its ¯rst period borrowers, and
nothing about the competitor's borrowers.
² The ¯rm chooses an o®er and invests I. If indi®erent, the ¯rm stays with the
inside bank.
² Pro¯ts are realized based on default information and soft information.
Similar to the case with information sharing, there is no pure strategy equilibrium,
but there is a mixed-strategy one.
Let Fu(r) denote the bidding strategy of the uninformed bank - the cumulative
density function that describes the uninformed bank's choice of interest rates. Given
the ¯rst-period monitoring ', the pro¯t functions for the incumbent bank can be
written as follows:
¼GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r))
¼GD
i (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r))
¼BN
i (r) = NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r))
¼BD
i (r) = NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r))
12The uninformed bank only has one bidding function since it cannot distinguish be-
tween any of the types in this case - not even between defaulting and non-defaulting
borrowers.
The pro¯t function for the uninformed bank is given as follows:
¼u(r) =NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGN
i (r)) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FGD
i (r))+
+ NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FBN
i (r)) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ FBD
i (r))
The proportions of the types and their success probabilities are expressed in the
same way as in the previous case.
Note that pGD can be either higher or lower than pBN. In particular, from the
above expressions we get that pGD < pBN (breakeven rates rGD > rBN) whenever
'2pL(1 ¡ pH)(pH ¡ pL) < (1 ¡ ')2pH(1 ¡ pL)(pH ¡ pL)







1¡'. This means for relatively low value of ',
the default/no default distinction will be more important than the one between good
and bad signals, so that those who get a bad signal but have not defaulted are expected
to perform better than those who have defaulted but produced a good signal.
We will say that monitoring is low whenever the above inequality is satis¯ed (pGD <
pBN). The equilibrium strategy depends on the level of monitoring (which made no
di®erence under default information sharing), and we describe it in the case with low
monitoring here.6.
Let us de¯ne two important break-even interest rates:
² r0, the break-even interest rate for the group containing bad-signal borrowers and
those that have generated a good signal, but have defaulted - BN, GD, BD,
that is all borrower groups except the very best one (good-signal, non-defaulting
GN);
² r00 is the break-even interest rate for the remaining two least quali¯ed groups, the
defaulting borrowers GD and BD (both good- and bad-signal).
The break-even interest rates are shown on the real line in Figure 1 (where rGD
and rBN do not have to be above r)
Proposition 2.4 Equilibrium Strategy There is an equilibrium in mixed strategies
in which the incumbent bank bids as follows:
² bid only for the good-signal borrowers that have not defaulted between r and r0;




     
  N r   r   BN r   ' r   ' ' r r D    BD r   GD r   GN r  
Figure 1: Interest rates (for low ')
FGN
i (r) = 1 +
NBN(pBNr ¡ I) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
NGN(pGNr ¡ I)
² bid for non-defaulting borrowers that have generated a bad signal between r0 and
r00;
FBN
i (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr ¡ I) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
NBN(pBNr ¡ I)
² bid for good-signal borrowers that have defaulted between r00 and rBD, where rBD
is the break-even interest rate on bad-signal borrowers that have defaulted;
FGD
i (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr ¡ I)
NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
over the [r00;rBD] interval for good-signal defaulting borrowers.
² bid only the break-even rBD for bad-signal, defaulting borrowers.
The uninformed bank will bid
Fu(r) = 1 ¡
pGNr¡I











pGDr¡I for r in [r00;rBD) and will have
an atom at rBD.
Proof: See Appendix.
Once again better types get better interest rates from the incumbent. The interest
rate strategies are also illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. First, note that none of the banks bids
below r, or above rBD. The reasoning is the same as above (losses for the uninformed
bank below r, Bertrand competition above rBD).
14The informed bank starts by bidding for the best group GN in the region [r;r0], that
is, up to where it reaches the break-even interest rate for the next three lower-quality
types. Then, starting from r0, it switches to bidding for the second-best group. It then
bids for the third-best group once the break-even interest rate for the remaining two
types (r00) is reached. Finally, the incumbent bank only bids the break-even interest
rate for the worst group { borrowers that have generated a bad signal and defaulted.
The structure of the equilibrium is similar in the case of high monitoring (high '), but
in that case the order of the two middle types (BN and GD) is reversed: generating
a good signal is more important than not defaulting.
The bidding of the informed bank is similar to that in the case of information sharing
(where we only had two types). It starts with the highest-quality type until it gets to
the break-even interest rate for the next type (or pooled types under no information
sharing). At that rate, bidding for the remaining types becomes pro¯table for the
outside bank. If the informed bank were to start with a lower-quality type, it would
be undercut by the outside bank and lose the higher-quality borrowers. (The outside
bank would be making positive pro¯ts in that case, just as it would by undercutting
in the pure-strategy case.)
Given the unique distribution function of the uninformed bank (the uninformed
bank cannot distinguish between groups), the informed bank cannot bid the same
interest rate for two di®erent groups. This is because the payo®s from these groups
are di®erent for di®erent borrower types (di®erent success probabilities, or di®erent
slopes of the pro¯t function), and, for a given Fu, the incumbent bank would want
to deviate and bid a higher/ lower interest rate in the neighborhood of a given r and
increase pro¯ts. The bank will bid on consecutive intervals for borrowers of di®erent
quality, and choosing any interest rates on those intervals will bring the same expected
pro¯ts. There will be no deviations to higher/ lower intervals because bidding there
would bring lower pro¯ts. As it may be expected, better quality borrowers get lower
interest rates, and the incumbent bank makes positive pro¯ts on all types except the
worst one, while the uninformed bank makes zero pro¯ts on average.
The incumbent bank's total pro¯ts (the sum over four di®erent subgroups) are
equal to:
¼
no sharing, high '
i =NGN(pGNr ¡ I) + NBN(pBNr0 ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r0)) + NGD(pGDr00 ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r00));
since the last sum ¼BD
i (r) = NBD(pBDr¡I)(1¡Fu(r)) is equal to 0 (the incumbent
bids the break-even rate for the worst type, rBDpBD = I), Fu(r) = 0 (as the outside
bank never bids below r), and pro¯ts have to be constant in the interval over which
the bank has positive probabilities in the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Expressing the proportions and success probabilities, as well as the cdf functions
as functions of pH;pL;¸ and I we get the following results:








bent bank's gross pro¯ts are given by:
¼
no sharing, low '
i = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH(1 ¡ ¸)pL
(pH ¡ pL + (pHpL + (1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL))(2' ¡ 1))







1¡'), the informed bank makes
gross pro¯ts equal to
¼
no sharing, high '
i = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
(2' ¡ 1 + 2'(1 ¡ ')(pH ¡ pL)))
Proof See Appendix.
In the next subsection, we look at interest rates and switching under informa-
tion sharing. We show that their sensitivity to increasing levels of investment in soft
information-monitoring, depends on the realization (good or bad) of the soft informa-
tion. The resulting magnitude will then depend on the level of investment in monitor-
ing. We then show that monitoring is higher under information sharing.
2.2 Interest Rates and Switching
The next two propositions analyze interest rates and switching under information
sharing. They show that interest rates and switching may be higher or lower depending
whether the signals produced in the monitoring process are bad or good.
Proposition 2.6 Under information sharing the interest rates bid by the outside bank
are at least as low as without information sharing. For the incumbent bank, the same
is true when the shared information is positive (no default), while interest rates are
weakly higher when the information is negative (default).
Proof The proof is straightforward: the comparison of the interest rates is illustrated
in ¯gures 2 and 3.
In words, information sharing facilitates e±cient allocation of credit. Better types
are better o®, while worse types are worse o®. As we shall see later, higher investment in
soft technology under information sharing regime strengthens this e®ect, providing the
better types with even lower interest rates. Note for instance, that that the informed
bank's cdf under information sharing for group BN is just rBN, satisfying
FBN
i = rBN · r 2 [r0;r00]
16where the latter interval is the one in which the incumbent bids for group BN
under no information sharing. This prediction is consistent with empirical ¯ndings on
information sharing (Brown et al 2007, Jappelli and Pagano 2002), and is con¯rmed
in our empirical model speci¯cations in the empirical section.
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Figure 2: Uninformed bank: The dash-dotted lines are the cdf's under information sharing,
with atom at rBN for group N, and atom rBD for group D. The solid piecewise linear
function stands for the cdf under no information sharing, with atom at rBD.
Proposition 2.7 Under information sharing the distribution of interest rates at a
lower ' ¯rst order stochastically dominates the distribution at a higher ' for the in-


















The main intuition is still preserved: better types get better interest rates by the
incumbent. However, better in this context is measured by either a higher precision of
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Figure 3: Informed bank (incumbent): The dash-dotted lines are the cdf's under information
sharing, for GN and GD groups, atom rBN is for group BN, and atom rBD is for group
BD. The solid function stands for the cdf's of the incumbent under no information sharing.






is non-increasing in the amount of monitoring.
Proof See Appendix.
Thus, under information sharing regime, if the investment in soft information is
higher, we should observe less switching for good signal borrowers, and more for high
signal borrowers. The next subsection will then establish that monitoring is higher
under information sharing. The proof ¯rst shows that an interest rate distribution of-
fered to good signal borrowers at a given level of ' ¯rst-order stochastically dominates
to another at a lower level of '. First note that the updated probability of a borrower
being of high ability is higher when the good signal is a result of a higher level of
monitoring:
@pGN
@' ¸ 0. Thus, when the outcome good signal is the result of higher
monitoring, it is more valuable, and the incumbent tries to keep the borrower by o®er-
ing higher rates with smaller probability (smaller F(r) at higher '). In an equilibrium
with higher ', this is incorporated in the outsider's choice: since it understands the
18incumbent is even better able to accurately evaluate borrowers, the pool that it faces
gets worse: Thus the probability the incumbent bids a higher than any rate bidden by
the outsider is lower Thus, this o®ers a testable prediction: if there is less switching
when soft information is good, and more switching when it is bad, then it may be due
to higher investment in soft information.7
In the next subsection, we show that monitoring is higher under information shar-
ing, and, moreover, hard and soft information are strategic substitutes. We then show
that the optimal level of investment in soft information is increasing in the level of
adverse selection.
2.3 Optimal Monitoring
We can now compare the optimal choices of monitoring with and without informa-
tion sharing. Denote H = 0 or H = 1 for hard information sharing and no sharing,
respectively (hard information is/ is not a source of pro¯ts).
Proposition 2.9 Banks choose higher monitoring when default information is shared.







The intuition behind this result is as follows. When default information is not
shared, banks derive their informational advantage { positive pro¯ts on high-quality
borrowers { from two sources: the \hard" result provided by the actual repayment of a
borrower, and the \soft" signal generated by monitoring. When default information is
shared, it ceases to be a source of informational rents. Incumbent banks then substitute
for this loss by investing more in soft information. With information sharing the
marginal bene¯t of collecting soft information is higher than it is without information
sharing. Thus banks will monitor their borrowers more closely when hard information
is shared - although their total pro¯ts will be lower.
The next proposition shows the sensitivity of the optimal investment in soft infor-
mation with respect to the information asymmetry in the market.
7The average rate and switching across di®erent information regimes will depend on the proportion
of good/bad signal outcome as well as on the exact levels of investing in soft information under the two
regimes(the di®erence in these levels) which will depend on the cost of monitoring. As the next subsection
shows, soft information is higher under information sharing. if the cost of monitoring is quite low, then this
gap in monitoring investment can be quite large. In that case, if all borrowers produce good signals, then
average interest rate may be lower under information sharing. If the signals are , bad they will get much
worse rates.
8The pro¯t function ¼(';1 ¡ H), has increasing di®erences: that is, there is strategic complementarity
between soft information and hard information sharing (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
19Proposition 2.10 Optimal investment in monitoring is increasing in the level of






First note that ¸(1 ¡ ¸) is the appropriate measure of asymmetric information:
when ¸ = 1
2 the uninformed bank is most interested to reveal types. In the other
extremes, when ¸ = 0 or ¸ = 1, the uninformed bank has nothing to learn. Since
asymmetric information is most acute when ¯rms are small and opaque, we get the
prediction that investment in monitoring should be higher when lenders deal with small
¯rms under information sharing arrangement. We test this hypothesis in the empirical
chapter.
2.4 Discussion
The conclusion of our paper is in some sense an optimistic one. We show that when
default information is shared, banks have an incentive to increase their investment in
soft information. As a result, in the presence of a credit bureau, banks will know both
their competitors' and their own borrowers better. Thus, far from being a danger to
information collection, credit bureaus can actually improve lending decisions - as well
as increasing bank competition.
Of course, hard information has been modeled in our paper as default information.
Default information is an automatic result of the lending process and banks have little
leeway in deciding how much to \invest" in it. If banks had the choice about how much
to spend on hard information, one may think that they would reduce that outlay in
the presence of a credit bureau. The result may well be a decrease in the quality of
hard information, which can compensate for the increase in soft information.
We believe that this concern is largely unwarranted. By de¯nition, hard information
is veri¯able. Therefore a bank that has to collect and transmit the hard information
would ¯nd it di±cult not to do that. Moreover, some of the hard information - such as
accounting data - is already in the hands of potential borrowers and and they can easily
transfer it from one bank to another even in the absence of a credit bureau. Among the
remaining examples of hard information, the most important are the default history
and the overall debt exposure of a given borrower. While bad borrowers may have
little interest in disclosing this information truthfully, banks face little additional costs
in conveying this information to a credit bureau - and the information can then be
easily veri¯ed.
Given that we have assumed that all borrowers are creditworthy and that there are
no deadweight losses of bankruptcy, there is no welfare di®erence between information
sharing and no information sharing in our model. We have made that assumption to
20make the exposition easier. If we had assumed that the low types are not creditworthy,
we would have also had to decide (more or less arti¯cially) which proportion in the
mix of good and bad borrowers is no longer creditworthy. For instance, the group of
bad and defaulting borrowers could be creditworthy or not, as could the groups of bad
and non-defaulting and/or good and defaulting borrowers, depending on the values of
Á. Looking into all these possible cases would have complicated the description of the
model with no obvious bene¯ts.
It is easy to see however that in the presence of bankruptcy costs/ borrowers that
are not creditworthy, the case of information sharing, which generates better lending
decisions, increases welfare. The broad message of our paper supports the establish-
ment of credit bureaus.
3 Empirical Evidence: Hypotheses and Data
3.1 Hypotheses
The empirical section tests the theoretical predictions of our paper using a
¯rm-level sample from transition countries.
One of our main theoretical results is that soft information acquisition in-
creases when hard information is shared. This is our ¯rst hypotheses, that we
test using two measures of soft information acquisition. We also look at how
the soft information produced relates to interest rates and switching empirically,
supporting our theory that successful soft information outcomes reduce interest
rates and switching, while bad outcomes increase both.
Earlier studies have focused on the in°uence of information sharing on credit
market performance, or ¯rms' access to credit. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) use
aggregate data to show bank lending to the private sector is larger and default
rates are lower in countries where information sharing is more solidly established
and extensive, controlling for other economic and institutional determinants of
bank lending, such as country size, GDP, growth rate, and variables capturing re-
spect for the law and protection of creditor rights. Djankov et al. (2007) con¯rm
that private sector credit relative to GDP is positively correlated with informa-
tion sharing in their recent study of credit market performance and institutional
arrangements in 129 countries for the period 1978 to 2003. These papers suggest
a possible positive in°uence of information sharing on credit activity. We delve
deeper into the details of credit bureaus and examine the banks' incentives to
invest in information acquisition when hard information is shared.
Going beyond our main hypotheses, we also test whether the magnitude of
the e®ects is higher for small than for large ¯rms. The model predicts that soft
21information acquisition increases when hard information is shared, but also that
the optimal level of soft information is higher when asymmetric information is
higher. Indeed, earlier research has shown that information can be particularly
important for small ¯rms since they are unlikely to be monitored by rating agen-
cies, and information asymmetries are most acute in small ¯rms (see, for example
Petersen and Rajan (1994)). Existing evidence also suggests that information
sharing bene¯ts all ¯rms, but it does more for small ¯rms than large ¯rms in
terms of credit cost and credit access (Love and Mylenko 2003, Brown et al 2007).
Part of what we test is to complement those results, looking at whether credit
cost changes depending on soft information outcome, and whether this is stronger
for small ¯rms.
There are a few additional reasons why one may expect a di®erence in this
e®ect for large vs. small ¯rms. First, credit information sharing arrangements
target mainly the small business and consumer markets (unlike credit rating
agencies, that usually deal with large ¯rms), and their introduction will a®ect
small ¯rms more. Second, since large ¯rms already have available information,
produced for instance by credit rating agencies, or by their more developed inter-
nal and external reporting, sharing information via credit bureaus should have
a lower impact for these ¯rms. Part of what is available in a standard credit
bureau report may already be available without a credit bureau for a large ¯rm
- e.g., information on company pro¯le, audited ¯nancial statements, risk class of
the borrower. Thus, apart from testing that hard information sharing increases
soft information acquisition, we test whether it is stronger for small ¯rms.
We then go on to study switching and interest rate implications. Speci¯cally,
proposition 2.6 in the theoretical chapter predicts that interest rates are on av-
erage lower in information sharing countries, supporting earlier empirical results
(Brown et al 2007, Jappelli and Pagano 2002). This prediction is also supported
in our empirical models. Moreover, according to proposition 2.8, when invest-
ment in soft information increases, the incumbent will lower rates for good signals
and increase them for bad signals (good and bad signals will be more important
when they are the outcome of higher investment in soft information): the bank
gets more responsive with higher informativeness ('). We test and support the
prediction.
The model derives the prediction that under hard information sharing, switch-
ing is increasing in the amount of investment in soft information, when the signals
produced are bad, and decreasing when they are good. If the soft information is
favorable (it gives good signal about the borrower's operations), the incumbent
will be more interested in keeping relationship with the borrower and can a®ord
more lenient contract terms; while holding up the borrower, the advantageous
22information will (more likely) be realized through actual lending. However, if
the signal produced is bad, it would lower the chances that the incumbent bank
extend credit. Thus, borrowers may switch less or more depending if the signal
produced is good or bad.
We test whether produced favorable soft signals will give a higher lock-in
power to the incumbent, allowing it to keep existing borrowers. We ¯nd that
under hard information sharing, switching is lower when signals are good and
that it is higher when signals are bad, concluding that this is related to higher
investment in soft information.
3.2 Data
We draw our data from two main sources. Country level data on information
sharing is taken from the World Bank/IFC \Doing Business" database. We
relate this to ¯rm-level information taken from the EBRD/World Bank Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).
Between 1991 and 2005 information sharing institutions were established in
17 of the 26 transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.9
We use the information sharing index constructed by Brown et al (2007) as
one of our measures of the depth of information sharing in di®erent countries.
The index measures the presence and structure of public credit registries and
private credit bureaus on a scale of 1 to 5. It is constructed as the maximum of
two scores, one for PCR's and one for PCB's. The PCR score adds one point for
ful¯lling each of the following ¯ve criteria:
(i) both ¯rms and individuals are covered,
(ii) positive and negative data is collected and distributed,
(iii) the registry distributes data which is at least two years old,
(iv) the threshold for included loans is below per capita GDP, and
(v) the registry has existed for more than 3 years.
The PCB score is computed in the same way. The index is then taken as an
average over years 1996 to 1999 for the analysis of year 2002, and average over
2000-2003 for year 2005.
Detailed de¯nitions of all variables are available in Appendix B. The BEEPS
2002 provides data on 6153 ¯rms in 26 transition countries and covers a represen-
tative sample of ¯rms for each of these countries (survey was done in all countries
where EBRD is operational except Tajikistan), while BEEPS 2005 covers over
9655 ¯rms.
9For a comprehensive coverage see Table 1 in Brown et al 2007
23We drop all observations from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, due to lack of
institutional data. Together with missing dependent variables, this leaves us
with a sample of 5209 ¯rms at best from 24 countries for year 2002 and with
8599 for year 2005.
3.3 Model Speci¯cations
We start our empirical analysis with cross-sectional regressions using the
BEEPS 2002. The baseline speci¯cation relates each of our dependent variables
for ¯rm i in country j to the information sharing index in the ¯rms country, a
vector of other country characteristics, and a vector of ¯rm characteristics that
may a®ect ¯rms' incentives to produce soft information. Our dependent vari-
ables were collected during 2002, while information sharing is measured as the
average value of the index prior to the survey, i.e. from 1996 to 1999 for 2002,
and 2001-2003. Thus, we relate ¯rm-level information to countrywide measures
of information sharing that are predetermined with respect to credit variables
and this should address the potential endogeneity of information sharing with
respect to credit market performance (see also Brown et al 2007).
We will test our theory (Propositions 2.4, 2.5, 2.6) using 5 dependent vari-
ables. We examine three main aspects:
1) whether soft information acquisition has increased using measures of soft in-
formation (dependent variables react, checking account);
2) how switching has changed as a result of soft information acquisition, which
may have produced either good or bad signals about the borrower, using a measure
of whether the soft information has been good or bad (variable soft);
3) how cost of capital has changed depending on the soft signal.
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
We relate our information sharing index to ¯rm-level data on our indepen-
dent variables taken from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS)(see Table 1).
We use ¯ve dependent variables. The ¯rst two measure the investment in
proprietary information, the third one is a dummy showing whether the borrower
switched from the main bank, and the last one is the ¯rms' cost of capital:
1. the banks' reaction to the borrower's non-repayment during the relationship
(the reaction as perceived by the borrowers);
2. the use of checking account;
243. borrower switching/keeping relationship with the main bank;
4. the cost of capital.
Our cross-sectional analysis is based on data from BEEPS 2002 for (switching,
and banks' reaction), BEEPS 2005 is used for checking account and capital cost
is available in 2002 and 2005.
The reaction variable is based on survey results. The question in the survey
asks:
² Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If your ¯rm were to fall
behind in its bank repayments, which of the following would best describe
how you would expect the bank to react?
The possible answers are:
1. Extend the term of the loan without changing the conditions (=3).
2. Extend the term of the loan but increase the interest rate (=2).
3. Begin legal proceedings to take possession of some assets of the ¯rm (=1).
We argue higher values of the variable suggest the bank has a better knowledge
of the ¯rm, that it has a good picture of the potential problems and that it is
less likely to react abruptly in the case of late payments. In contrast, a bank
that does not invest in monitoring or screening its borrowers will simply take
late payments as a pure negative signal about the ¯rm's potential and will be
more likely to cease the banking relationship. Similar questions have been used
as proxies of soft information on earlier studies, that utilize companies' grading
of their main banks in terms of satisfaction (Ogura and Uchida (2006), Uchida,
Udell and Yamori (2007)).
The checking account variable is taken from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The
question in the survey asks: \Does your establishment have a checking or saving
account". It has been observed that the use of checking account gives the bank
advantageous information on the borrower and works as a monitoring tool for
the lender (Nakamura 1991, Degryse and van Cayseele 2000, Norden and Weber
2004). And while the pieces of information received via the checking account
are hard, the overall knowledge that the bank can obtain about the borrower
is soft (Norden and Weber 2004). Moreover, evidence suggests that there is a
positive impact of the checking account existence on the probability of personal
communication between the bank and the borrower, as well as a negative impact
on the bank size and the distance between the ¯rm and the borrower (Berger et
al 2005).
253.3.2 Firm-level explanatory variables
We include six ¯rm-level explanatory variables to control for the variation
in credit risk and ¯nancing requirements across ¯rms, and we use two di®erent
measures of good/bad soft information.10
From the BEEPS survey for 2002 and 2005, we construct the summary
variable soft, that measures how protected the borrower is from di®erent non-
¯nancial factors. It summarizes answers to 19 questions on \non ¯nancial prob-
lems of growth". The exact question in the survey asks: Can you tell me how
problematic are these factors for the operation and growth of your business?. The
factors include skills of workers, their education, contract violations by customers
and suppliers, among others. Arguably, relationship-speci¯c investment is neces-
sary to evaluate how problematic these factors are for the operations and growth
of the ¯rm, and therefore the main bank can have advantage over transactional
banks. Each of the questions is answered on a scale from 1-4, where higher values
stand for less obstacles (4=no obstacle, 1=major obstacle). We take the sum of
the 19 questions, and divide by 19*4, to range it from 0.25 to 1. We then take
1.25 - the value of the variable, so that higher values mean less problems, and
the variable still ranges from 0 to 0.75. We use the variable in the regressions for
switching and cost of capital, as a proxy for bad vs good signals. If the value of
the signal soft is important (the banks ¯nd it more valuable and more sensitive
to it), then it must be that it is the outcome of a higher investment in soft infor-
mation: the precision (and importance) of the signal is increasing in the amount
of ' (in the theory,
@pGN
@' > 0). We then use other proxies for the same purpose.
The management quality has been documented as one of the most important
soft characteristics of the ¯rm (see Grunert, Norden, Weber 2005). In our survey
it is the sum of three variables: previous experience of the manager within that
¯rm, the age of the manager, the manager's education. Each of the variables
takes several values in the survey. We scale them to 0 and 1, where 0 stands for
less favorable values. The variable ranges from 0 to 3, and higher values of the
management quality would mean better signals for the lender.
Younger ¯rms are generally considered as riskier than older ¯rms. However, in
transition countries ¯rm age also determines the economic regime under which
the ¯rm emerged. Thus, while older ¯rms may be less risky in general, they
may be riskier in transition countries, because they emerged during the pre-
transition or transition phase. Rather than controlling simply for ¯rm age, we
follow Brown et al (2007) and distinguish ¯rms by three categories depending on
10While we use the term soft information throughout the model, the important thing in our theory is that
the information be proprietary, and give an advantage to the bank that invests in it.
26whether they were established before 1989 (Pre-transition ¯rm), between 1989
and 1993 (Transition ¯rm), after 1993 (Post-transition ¯rm) (see also Gianetti
and Ongena 2005). We further include two control variables for ¯rm ownership.
State-owned ¯rm is a dummy variable that equals one if the government holds a
majority stake in the ¯rm. The e®ect of this variable is a priori ambiguous. On
the one hand, state ownership may reduce ¯rm risk in the eye of a bank, due to the
possible government bailout in case of default. On the other, state ownership may
increase default risk, owing to the political pressures on management to diverge
from pro¯t-maximizing policies (see Brown et al 2007). Moreover, these ¯rms
may receive public funding, which reduces their reliance on credit for investment
and therefore relieves a constraint on their growth. We include the the debt
ratio; previous research has shown that ¯rm with higher leverage switch more
often (e.g., Ongena and Smith 2001). This ¯nding is con¯rmed in our data.
Firm debt is also related to the ¯rm risk, and may therefore change incentives
to acquire soft information: one the one hand raising the leverage will raise the
borrower's risk, on the other hand, lower risk ¯rms can a®ord higher leverage.
As discussed above, we are also interested in the di®erential e®ect depending
on the ¯rm size. Moreover, it is customary to regard larger ¯rms as less risky,
other things equal. We distinguish small ¯rms from large ones by their number
of employees (Small ¯rm = 1-49, Large ¯rm ¸ 50).
Finally, in all our regressions we include sector dummies, to control for dif-
ferent ¯nance needs of ¯rms.11
Firm-level explanatory variables are detailed in the Appendix for variables.
Our sample is dominated by small ¯rms (67 %). Exactly half of the ¯rms were
established after 1993, and are thus categorized as post-transition ¯rms, while a
further 28% were established in the transition phase of 1989 1993. The majority
of ¯rms are privately owned, with only a minor share state-owned (14%). Of the
86% of privately owned ¯rms in the sample, 83% are de novo ¯rms, implying
that a total of 14% of our ¯rms are privatized companies. Our sample displays
a low level of transparency on average.
The data provides a similar sample of non-agricultural ¯rms across all coun-
tries. The sample is dominated by small ¯rms (67%) and private ¯rms (86%).
The sample includes ¯rms from the service and manufacturing sectors, with the
majority of ¯rms (54%) have their main activity in the service sector. All ¯rms
in the sample are at least 3 years old. The 2005 survey includes 9655 ¯rms. The
sample structure for the 2005 survey resembles by design that of the 2002 survey.
11Although some of these variables can be regarded as pieces of hard information, we believe the general
picture may have a proprietary nature for the main bank
273.3.3 Country-level variables
We include seven country-level variables to control for di®erences in the legal
environment, the structure of the banking sector, and macroeconomic perfor-
mance (Table 2 provides means of the variables): an index of creditor rights and
payment enforcement, banking reform, a measure of market structure/concentration,
a proxy for asymmetric information/borrower risk, a measure of foreign bank
presence, per capita GDP, and the in°ation rate.
The banking concentration measure is the share of the largest 5 banks in
terms of deposits (from Barth et al 2001): higher concentration may indicate
higher market power of the banks, higher informational lock in, and therefore
less switching. Moreover, since larger banks are less e±cient in collecting soft in-
formation (Berger et al 2005), higher concentration may have a negative impact
on the information acquisition. Also, in more competitive markets, banks antici-
pate a shorter expected lifespan of their relationships, and they may respond by
reducing their relationship-speci¯c investments. Weaker relationships may then
induce further switching.
We take the share of non performing loans as a measure of asymmetric infor-
mation. In markets with higher degree of risk, switching will be more costly: we
expect a negative sign on this variable for switching.
The Creditor rights variable is taken from Brown et al (2007): it is an aggre-
gate measure of creditor legal protection built with the methodology proposed
by La Porta et al. (1998). Higher values of this index imply that secured lenders
are better protected in case a borrower defaults.Indeed, earlier evidence suggests
that transition countries with better creditor protection have higher credit mar-
ket performance (Pistor et al. (2000), Brown et al 2007). However, not only
the law on the books matters for credit market development, but also its actual
enforcement. As a measure of actual enforcement of creditor protection, we also
include the variable Time to enforce payment, which measures the (log of the)
number of days it takes for a creditor to secure an outstanding payment through
the courts if a debtor defaults ( variable ltime). This variable is taken from
the World Bank/IFC \Doing Business" database (available from 2003 to 2007
only). Following (Ongena and Smith 2000), we use the multiplication of creditor
rights and a measure of institutional strength(speed of contract enforcement in
our example), since enforcement of creditor protection laws may be lax in coun-
tries with weak actual enforcement We expect it to be negatively correlated with
switching and cost of capital, consistent with the ¯nding that Judicial e±ciency is
negatively related with ¯rms patronizing a number of banks (Ongena and Smith
282000).12
The banking reform index is an index showing level of changes from a state
owned bank with soft-budget constraints to a commercial bankwith hard budget
constraints in a market economy. Foreign bank share is the asset share of for-
eign owned banks in each country. Recent evidence suggests that foreign bank
entry has improved credit market performance in transition countries, reduc-
ing intermediation spreads and facilitating credit access (Giannetti and Ongena
2005). Also, foreign bank presence may coincide with information sharing, if
these banks are familiar with the bene¯ts of credit reports from their home mar-
kets, and therefore tend to patronize private credit bureaus also in their host
countries. Alternatively, when foreign banks are serving foreign ¯rms in the
host country, they might be able to access information on those ¯rms through
their home bureaus, and are less interested in information sharing. We include
in°ation and log of per capita GDP, as previous evidence suggests that macroe-
conomic stabilization is associated with an expansion in ¯nancial intermediation
in transition countries (Fries and Taci, 2002).
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Soft Information Acquisition
Our aim is to provide empirical evidence that in support of the theory: banks
invest more in soft information once hard information is shared. In order to
examine this hypothesis, which is also the main message of our paper, we look
at several aspects:
² the way banks react to late payments from their borrowers;
² the time banks spend analyzing demands for credit;
² the use of checking accounts as a way to accumulate information on bor-
rowers.
We begin with the \reaction" to late payments.
Banks' reaction
We argue that a more °exible reaction from banks to late payments is the
result of better soft information. The main regression is ordered probit, although
robust OLS estimates have the same signi¯cance.
12Using creditor right and time to enforce payment separately does not change our results.
29When we use the whole sample - both large and small ¯rms - we have high
signi¯cance for the information sharing index. Columns two and three look at
the subsamples of large and small ¯rms. At it may be expected, given the higher
importance of soft information for small ¯rms, we get a very strong result for
their subsample. Banks are more likely to be °exible with small banks in the
presence of information sharing.
Creditor rights times contract enforcement seem to make banks less cooper-
ative (as perceived by the borrowers), especially for small ¯rms. This may be
owing for instance to the fact that banks realize starting legal procedures is more
likely to result in actual winning. As we expected, bank reform index has a neg-
ative sign: banks with binding hard-budget constraints will be stricter to their
borrowers. The regression shows that younger ¯rms seem to be less optimistic
about their bank's favorable response to a sudden non-repayment: in fact when
we replace transition/post transition with age, the coe±cients are signi¯cant.
For younger ¯rms after transition banks may have not yet accumulated enough
information via monitoring and therefore their reaction is more rigid.
Checking account
We provide evidence that checking accounts are used more in countries with
information sharing, which supports our hypothesis that there is more investment
in monitoring when hard information is shared.
Once again, the ¯rst column is the total sample. The second column is for
small ¯rms, and the third one is for large ¯rms. We do not ¯nd evidence in
favor of larger importance for small ¯rms for this variable. In all three cases
information sharing makes the use of checking accounts more likely.
We do not use debt/aset ratio due to the absence of this variable for year
2005. Concentration has a negative impact, in line with earlier arguments and
¯ndings (Berger et al. 2005). Higher concentration suggests that larger banks
are dominating in the industry, and less likely to invest in relationship-speci¯c
information. The creditor rights times (speed of) payment enforcement is again
positive, consistent with earlier ¯ndings that banks are willing to monitor bor-
rowers better as relationship is more likely to be single when creditor right and
payment enforcement are stronger. The positive e®ect of per capita GDP is con-
sistent with earlier ¯ndings of higher probability of owning a checking account
when income is higher (Vermilyea and Wilcox 2002). 13
13As this variable is taken from survey year 2005, we also complement this index with measures of credit
information sharing from IFC/Doing Business. We repeat our analysis using:
1. Coverage data that show percentage of population that has data in the bureau
2. An index of Credit Information constructed by IFC/Doing business
304.2 Switching or Staying with the Main Bank?
The switching variable is taken from the BEEPS 2002 survey. The question
in the survey asks, Has your ¯rm changed its main bank (the single bank with
which your ¯rm has the closest relationship) since 1998?'. Possible answers
include \yes", \no", \no main bank". 8 percent of the ¯rms report that they
have no main bank, and we exclude those ¯rms. This leaves us with a sample
of 5209 ¯rms. 26 percent of the ¯rms report that they have switched their main
bank. We also use the average information sharing index for year 1996-1998,
to estimate switching after establishing information sharing. We would like to
test whether soft (proprietary) information is important in information sharing
countries, and whether it is more important for small ¯rms. Our hypothesis is
that switching will depend on the outcome of the soft information signal, good
or bad: a) borrowers on whom good soft signals were received, switch less b) bad
signal borrowers switch more.
Variable soft is the proxy for the outcome of the soft signal. It measures how
protected the borrower is from di®erent non-¯nancial factors. It summarizes
answers to 19 questions on non ¯nancial problems of growth. The exact question
in the survey asks: Can you tell me how problematic are these factors for the
operation and growth of your business?. The factors include skills of workers,
their education, contract violations by customers and suppliers, among others.
Each of the questions is answered on a scale from 1-to 4, where higher values
stand for less obstacles (4=no obstacle, 1=major obstacle). We take the sum of
the 19 questions, and divide by 4*19. Thus, the variable ranges from 0.25 to 1,
where a value of 1 indicates that the received soft signals about the quality of
the borrower, have all been good/favorable (19 answers "no obstacle"). We then
take 1 - the value of the variable, so that higher values mean less problems.
We test proposition 2.5. The ¯rst regression is the basic one. The coe±cient
of 0:232 in the interaction term is rather large: we calculate its marginal e®ect
(0.066), which shows that going from 0.25 to 1 of the soft signal, the switching
3. Multiply coverage on PCB/PCR by a coe±cient that shows the depth, but not coverage, of the
information shared
The score adds for each of the following functions: (i) both ¯rms and individuals are covered, (ii) positive
and negative data is collected and distributed, (iii) the registry distributed data which is at least two years
old. Thus we do not add score for bureaus that share data above a certain amount of loans, or for bureaus
that share both individual and ¯rm data, since these are already included in the coverage number (although
adding these two results in little changes). We do the same for PCB, and then take the sum of the two
numbers (or take the maximum, which does change our results qualitatively). The estimates remain robust.
31probability decreases by 6.6 percent, making it possible that ¯rms with best
signals actually have a higher chance of staying with their main bank: one would
expect switching to increase in countries with information sharing. From the
lowest value of the information sharing, to the highest, this would mean up to 8
percent of decrease in the switching probability in information sharing countries.
This is rather high for a sample average of 26 percent. 14
The second column adds a third interaction term. We see there that the e®ect
of the soft signals in information sharing countries is higher for small ¯rms. The
third column includes the sub-sample where soft signals are above the median
value (Good signal), while the forth one includes observations where soft signals
are below or equal to the median value (Bad signal).
The 5th and the 6th columns repeat models in columns 1 and 2 proxying soft
signals by management quality.15
Creditor rights*contract enforcement is negatively related to switching from
with the main bank, which is consistent with the ¯nding that Judicial e±ciency is
negatively related with ¯rms patronizing a number of banks (Ongena and Smith
2000), as well as with theoretical arguments (Hart 1995, Bolton and Scharfstein
1996). Higher risk in the economy, as measured by the non-performing loans, is
related with higher probability of staying with the main bank. As we conjectured
privatized ¯rms may be less risky, and therefore switching costs can be lighter.
Post-transition and transition ¯rms switch less than pre-transition ¯rms: apart
from being younger, these ¯rms' behavior may be related with earlier ¯ndings
14When we drop per capita GDP and in°ation, as they have no signi¯cance in the model, this does not
alter our results. We also tried using GDP growth as one of the country controls: evidence suggests that
in markets with high growth banks may be more aggressive in establishing market shares (see for example
Sharpe 1997). Results do not change qualitatively.
15The management quality has been documented as one of the most important soft characteristics of
the ¯rm (see Grunert, Norden, Weber 2005). In BEEPS survey it is the sum of three variables: previous
experience of the manager within that ¯rm, the age of the manager, the manager's education, as well as the
skills and education of the workers. Each of the variables takes several values in the survey. We scale them
to range from 0 to 1, 0 standing for less favorable values. Thus, higher values of the \management quality"
would mean better signals for the lender. Taken piece by piece some of variables are hard information - not
necessarily shared by information bureaus; however, the general picture may have proprietary nature for
the main bank. We also use the management quality for other models in the table and get similar results.
We then complement the analysis with a variable overdue payments on items about which credit bureaus
do not share information. We use two di®erent questions in the survey. 1. Do you currently have overdue
payments over 90 days to the following: employees, utilities, suppliers, government: 2. Have you had to
resolve an overdue payment in the court? While the nature of information is hard, most of the information
is not shared via information sharing institutions (information on utilities and retailers is shared only in
Estonia and in Kazakhstan). And although one may argue that for example information on taxes may be
received through other sources, learning about employee overdue payments can require more e®orts from
the main bank. One may therefore believe that part of this information is advantageous for the main bank,
and it can make better assessments of creditworthiness.
32that switching lenders is more probable as the duration of relationship increases
(Ongena and Smith 2001). Our post-transition ¯rms, established after 1993, may
still be in the beginning of their relationship, and 1998-2001 can be too early a
stage to switch.
4.3 Cost of capital
We analyze the e®ects of information on cost of capital. It ranges from 1 to
4, with higher values indicating a higher cost of ¯nancing. It equals 4, if cost of
¯nance is reported to be a major obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 2 = minor
obstacle, 1 = no obstacle. Unlike Brown et al. (2007) we also take into account
soft information. They ¯nd that cost of capital is lower in countries with infor-
mation sharing, and that this e®ect is larger for small, opaque ¯rms. We would
like to test whether soft (proprietary) information in°uences cost of capital in
information sharing countries, and whether it is more important for small ¯rms.
Results. We ¯nd that the interaction of soft signal and information sharing
has a negative and large sign, indicating that cost of capital goes down when
the soft signal gets better (the output is ordered probit, although robust OLS
estimated give almost identical results). From the ¯rst two rows of the ¯rst
column one can see that the ¯rms with worst signals (Soft=4.75) will actually
experience an increase in cost of capital. The marginal e®ects show that while
cost of access goes up by 0.44 for the worst signal borrower, it actually reduces
by 0.25 for the best signals for one point of the information sharing index (and
information sharing index is constructed to range from 0 to 5) This is quite
large given that the sample average of cost of capital is 2.53. Consistent with
our discussion of small and large ¯rms, and proposition 2.4, columns 2 and 3
show that the signal matters more for the small ¯rms. The model con¯rms that
privatized ¯rms are less risky, and experience less problem of capital cost. We
did not have any a priori prediction as to the sign post-transition and transition
variables, since these are younger ¯rms but, as argued before, may be less risky
on the other hand, than pre-transition ¯rms. Stronger creditor rights and faster
contract enforcement seem to reduce cost of capital. Foreign bank presence seems
to increase cost of capital: Karapetyan and Stacescu (2008) show that foreign
bank presence is related to less coverage of the credit bureaus, where coverage
is not captured in our information sharing index due to lack of coverage data in
that period. Table 2 table repeats this analysis using panel estimates from 2002
and 2005. The results for access to capital, de¯ned similarly, are very similar to
table 7 and 8 and are not reported for brevity.
335 Conclusions
It seems reasonable to think that when information is shared via credit bu-
reaus or public credit registers banks will have lower incentives to invest in mon-
itoring their borrowers and the quality of lending decisions may decline.
Starting from the distinction between hard and soft information, and the
observation that only the former is likely to be shared through pooling arrange-
ments, we show that banks are actually likely to invest more in acquiring soft
information when hard information is shared. The intuition behind the result
is simple. When banks do not share any information, they derive informational
rents from both hard and soft information, and the marginal contribution of soft
information to bank pro¯ts is lower. When hard information is shared, then the
marginal bene¯ts from soft information are higher and banks will choose a higher
level of investment.
Moreover, we show that switching may not necessarily increase after informa-
tion sharing, as one may otherwise think is the case. The switching result will
depend on that actual -positive or negative - value of the soft signal received.
This will improve the accuracy of lending decisions and may be useful for small
¯rms that are di®erentiated along \soft" characteristics. Thus one of the appar-
ent victims of information sharing { borrowers that require signi¯cant investment
in information { may actually bene¯t from the existence of credit bureaus.
Our results obviously present an important argument in favor of information
sharing. They also point to an interesting implication in terms of the structure
of the banking system. In particular, information sharing may widen the gap
between small banks relying on collecting soft information and large banks relying
on standardized, hard information (Stein 2002, Berger et al. (2005)): indeed,
information sharing increases small banks' incentives to collect soft information
and makes it easier for large banks to get their standardized data.6 References
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Chicago1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof is done by way of contradiction (see
also von Thadden 2004, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) for proofs in similar se-
tups). Consider either of the two pools of borrower population - the defaulters
(market D), or the non-defaulters (N). In either of these two markets we have
two banks: the incumbent bank, that can distinguish between \good" and \bad"
signal borrowers, and the outside bank, which does not observe these signals.
The incumbent bank can therefore condition its interest rates on the two ob-
served signals, while the outside bank cannot do the same. Let ri(B) and ri(G)
be the pure-strategy interest rates charged by the incumbent bank conditional
on bad and good signal, respectively, while ru is the interest rate charged by the
outside bank.
1) Suppose ¯rst that ru is lower than both ri(B) and ri(G). Then the in-
formed bank could increase its pro¯ts by charging an interest rate ru ¡² just for
successful borrowers. Thus this cannot be and equilibrium.
2) Suppose next that ri(G) · ru · ri(B). Then the uninformed bank attracts
only bad borrowers. For the uninformed bank to break even, we have to have
that ru ¸ rD, the break-even rate for bad borrowers. If ri(G) < ru, then the
informed bank could increase the interest rate for good borrowers and boost its
pro¯ts. If we have equality, then the uninformed bank could raise its pro¯ts by
charging ri(G) ¡ ² and lending to all borrowers.
3) If ri(B) · ru · ri(G), then the uninformed bank is making positive pro¯ts
on successful borrowers and the informed bank is making nonnegative pro¯ts on
defaulting borrowers. The informed bank could then undercut to ru ¡ ² for suc-
cessful borrowers, and increase pro¯ts while capturing the whole market. This
means there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the bidding game.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
If default information is shared, each bank can separate its competitor's suc-
cessful borrowers from the failing ones. The incumbent bank can additionally
distinguish between good and bad-signal borrowers, so it retains some informa-
tional advantage.
The informational advantage - the G or B signal - is in place for two di®erent
markets (pools of borrowers)- for (a)defaulters, and for (b) non-defaulters. As a
result, for each of these two pools the competition between the incumbent andthe outside bank has only a mixed-strategy equilibrium: the bad signal borrowers
in each of the two markets are the worst group of borrowers in the respective
market, over whom the incumbent has no informational advantage.
Given the bidding strategy of its competitor, the expected pro¯ts for the
incumbent can be written as
¼
GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
GD
i (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
BN
i (r) = NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r);)
¼
BD
i (r) = NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
The uninformed bank will not be able to make that distinction -distinction
between good and bad signal, but it will make pro¯ts of the two di®erent pools
¼u(r)
D = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GD




N = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN
i (r));
As in the proof of proposition 1, we now concentrate on either of the market




i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
BN
i (r) = NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r);)
The uninformed bank gets
¼u(r)
N = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN
i (r));
The construction of the mixed strategy equilibrium follows a sequence of stan-
dard arguments, which is similar to that outlined in Hauswald and Marquez 2000
and Hauswald and Marquez 2006.
Lemma 1 Both banks randomize their loan o®ers over the same interval
[rN;rBN]. Moreover, the informed bank earns positive expected pro¯ts and the
uninformed one breaks even.
Proof Claim 1. Both banks o®er loan rates [rN;[rBN], where R is the return
from the project.The uninformed bank will never bid less than rN = 1
pN, since borrowers
switch banks at any o®er so that the loan pool has a success probability of at
most pN: But then, the informed bank will never o®er rates below rN to its high
quality customers (Signal=G) making positive pro¯ts on high-quality borrowers:
¼GN
i (r) > 0: Clearly, neither the informed nor the uninformed bank will o®er
(gross) rates above rBN, since any of the lender can undercut and get all of the
borrowers and make positive pro¯ts on them:
Claim 2. Continuity of Fi on its support.
Suppose there otherwise there is an r0 in the support, such that F G
i (r0¡) <
F G
i (r0). But then ¼u(r0¡) > ¼u(r0) (since pGNr ¡ I > 0, and Fi is right contin-
uous). Since ¼N
u is also right-continuous, there exists a neighborhood [r0;r0 + ²],
² > 0, on which Fu must be constant implying Fu(r0) = Fu(r0¡). Hence, by
expression of the pro¯t function above, Fi(r) is continuous at r0 and strictly in-
creasing in the neighborhood; but then, it can not have any mass on [r0;r0 + ²]
so thatFi(r0) = Fi(r0¡), contradicting the assumption of an atom at r0.
Claim 3 The lower and upper bounds of the supports are equal.
Denote lower bounds by r. Let's ¯rst show ri ¸ ru. Note that otherwise
¼i = 0 for r 2 (ru;ri), which contradicts the positivity of pro¯ts for the informed
bank. Then, suppose ri > ru. In that case ¼u(ri) > ¼u(ru), since the uninformed
bank has the same probability of having the lowest interest rate at ri as at ru.
Therefore the two lower bounds must be the same. Denote the upper bound
((denote r¤):
Now, if r¤u < r¤i, then again ¼i < 0 for (r¤u;r¤i], contradicting positivity of
i's pro¯ts thus r¤i · r¤u · rBN. Also it can't be that r¤G < rBN, since then
the informed bank would not be bidding in (r¤G
i ;rBN), and then the uninformed
bank would be better o® increasing its rate. Thus, r¤i = r¤u = rBN
Claim 4. The uninformed bank breaks even: thus the lower bounds are equal
to [rN] and the supports for both banks are given by the interval [rN;rBN].
It is a standard result in models of competition under asymmetric information
that a bidder, all of whose information is known by some other competitor, makes
zero pro¯ts (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1993), von Thadden 2004).
Claim 5. The informed bank bids rBN for the bad signal borrowers.
We have already argued by using the standard undercutting argument, that
rg cannot exceed rBN. Now, it also cannot be strictly smaller, since the informed
bank would be making losses.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium distribution functions Fi;Fu are continuous and
strictly increasing over an interval [rN;rBN], so that pro¯ts ¼u and ¼i are con-
stant there.See also Hauswald and Marquez 2000. Our proof is otherwise identical.
Concluding, while the incumbent will only bid the breakeven interest rate on
the bad-signal borrowers and make zero pro¯ts on those borrowers, it will ran-
domize over the interval [r;rB] for the good signal borrowers, and make positive
pro¯ts on those particular subgroups.
The outside bank will randomize over the [rN;rBN] interval and make zero
pro¯ts. As argued, it will have to charge an interest rate equal to at least rN, since
it always faces the risk of attracting the low-quality borrowers. The incumbent
bank will make positive expected pro¯ts (it will o®er at least to its successful
borrowers, which actually have a higher probability of success than ).
The incumbent bank will choose di®erent interest rates for the defaulters and
non-defaulters, getting the following pro¯ts:
¼
GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
GD
i (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
since the other two expressions are now 0.
Lemma 3: The unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
Let us keep on proving only for the N case. Since in the mixed strategy
equilibrium the incumbent has constant pro¯ts over the whole support (for any
individual market), we can write for some constant k
¼
GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r)) = k
Note now, that F N




i (rN) = NGN(pGNrN ¡ I) = k = ¼
GN
i (r)












u (r) = 1 ¡
NGN(pGNrN ¡ I)
NGN(pGNr ¡ I)
on [rN;rBN] with a mass at rBN of
NGN(pGNrN¡I)
NGN(pGNrBN¡I)).
Following similar arguments for group D
F
D
u (r) = 1 ¡
NGD(pGDrN ¡ I)
NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
on [rD;rBD], with a mass atrBD of
NGD(pGDrN¡I)
NGD(pGDrBD¡I)).
Now, looking for the distribution of the informed, observe that
The uninformed bank gets
¼u(r)
N = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN










on [rN;rBN] and rBN










on [rD;rBD] and rBD
i = rBD.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
The pro¯t functions for the uninformed bank are:
¼u(r)
D = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GD




N = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN
i (r)):In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, as shown above, the outside bank will bid
over the whole interval [r;rBK], for both types, and it will make zero pro¯ts.
The pro¯t functions for the incumbent bank are:
¼
GN















i (r) = NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
D
u (r))
The incumbent makes zero pro¯ts on the bad-signal borrowers, but it makes
positive pro¯ts on the good-signal borrowers.
We have the proportion of each borrower type:
NGN = ¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
NGD = ¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
NBN = ¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL
NBD = ¸(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'(1 ¡ pL):
and the updated probabilities:
pN =
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
pD =
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)
pGN =
¸'p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')p2
L
¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
pBN =
¸(1 ¡ ')p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)'p2
L
¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL
pGD =
¸'pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
pBD =
¸(1 ¡ ')pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL(1 ¡ pL)





u = 1 ¡




u = 1 ¡
pGD¹ rD ¡ I
pGDr ¡ I
:with an atom at rBD and rBN respectively.
Expected pro¯ts have to be constant over the whole interval - they are there-




i = NGN(pGNrN ¡ I)
¼
GD
i = NGD(pGDrD ¡ I)











H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)









Proof of Propositions 2.4 and 2.5
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the informed bank can pick di®erent in-
terest rates for each type, and pro¯ts will be di®erent for each of them:
¼
GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
GD
i (r) = NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
BN
i (r) = NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
¼
BD
i (r) = NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r));
where Fu is the cumulative density function that describes the uninformed
bank's choice of interest rates. As we will see, similar to the case without in-
formation sharingthe incumbent will bid the break-even rate for the bad signal
borrowers:
The outside bank will not be able to distinguish between borrowers based
on hard or soft information. It will therefore bid unconditional interest rates
which will attract those borrowers that have not received better o®ers from the
incumbent bank. The pro¯t function for the uninformed bank can be written as
follows:
¼u(r) =NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GD
i (r))+
+ NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN
i (r)) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BD
i (r)):In equilibrium, each of the banks has to be indi®erent between the interest
rates that it bids with positive probability { for each type, in the case of the
informed bank.
In equilibrium, the uninformed bank will not bid below r , since otherwise it
would make an expected loss. It will randomize over the interval [r;rBD].
In order to describe the bidding strategy of the incumbent bank let us take
r0 as de¯ned in detail in the body of the paper (the breakeven rate for the
mixed group BN, GD, BD) and r00 as the break-even interest rate for the group
of defaulting borrowers. The informed bank will pick interest rates from the
interval [r;r0] for the good-signal, non-defaulting borrowers. Why? Suppose it
otherwise bids up to r0+². But then the uninformed bank can o®er r0 in pure
strategy, give loans to the mixed group BN, GD, BD, and sometimes to GN
and thus make positive pro¯ts at the expense of the incumbent. By similar
reasoning, the incumbent o®ers interest rates from the [r0;r00] interval for the
bad-signal, non-defaulting borrowers, interest rates from the [r00;rBD] for good-
signal, defaulting borrowers and just rBD for the bad-signal defaulting borrowers.
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the banks have to get the same payo® for any
interest rate they o®er with a positive probability. This allows us to solve for the
density functions used by either bank. The pro¯ts on good-signal, non-defaulting
borrowers have to be constant over the [r;r0] interval:
¼
GN
i (r) = NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r)) = k
Evaluating the expression at r we get that k = NGN(pGNr ¡ I). Therefore
the cumulative density function for the uninformed bank over the [r;r0] interval
is




By a similar reasoning, the pro¯ts on non-defaulting bad-signal borrowers are
equal to ¼BN
i = NBN(pBNr0 ¡ I)(1 ¡ Fu(r0)), where Fu(r0) = 1 ¡
pGNr¡I
pGNr0¡I. The




pBNr¡I over the [r0;r00] interval.
Pro¯ts on the good-signal, defaulting borrowers will be ¼GD
i = NGD(pGDr00 ¡




pBNr00¡I. The density function






pGDr¡I for r in [r00;rBD) and will have an
atom at rBD.
The uninformed bank's pro¯ts should be constant over the interval [r;rBD].Evaluating the expression for ¼u at r we get ¼u(r) = 0; the uninformed bank
makes zero overall pro¯ts (see von Thadden (2004) for the details). Remember
now that
¼u(r) = 0 =NGN(pGNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GN
i (r)) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
GD
i (r))+
+ NBN(pBNr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BN
i (r)) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
BD
i (r)):
To get the expression for F GN
i (r), note that F GD
i (r),F BN
i (r),F BD
i (r) are equal
to 0 in [r;r0] Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent bank's strategy for GN is
characterized by the following cumulative density function:
F
GN
i (r) = 1 +
NBN(pBNr ¡ I) + NBD(pBDr ¡ I) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
NGN(pGNr ¡ I)




i (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr ¡ I) + NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
NBN(pBNr ¡ I)
noting that F GN
i (r) = 1 and F GD
i (r) = 0, F BD




i (r) = 1 +
NBD(pBDr ¡ I)
NGD(pGDr ¡ I)
over the [r00;rBD] interval for good-signal defaulting borrowers. Finally, the
informed bank will always bid rBD for the bad-signal, defaulting borrowers.
The informed bank will not want to bid for the good-signal, non-defaulting
borrowers above r0 , since pro¯ts would be lower in that region. It will also
not bid for the bad-signal, nondefaulting borrowers below r0 or above r00, since
pro¯ts are again lower in those regions { and it will also not want to bid for
good-signal, defaulting borrowers below r00. This is because, given the expression
for Fu, pro¯ts would be increasing (decreasing) in r below (above) the region
where the bank is bidding for a given type of borrowers.Summing up, the expected pro¯ts of the informed bank in the low-' case are:



















We plug in step by step the expressions for probabilities and interest rates:
pGDr00 ¡ I =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(2Á ¡ 1)
(¸(1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ phi))(¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL))
pBNr00 ¡ I =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pH(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pH)Á)




(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(2Á ¡ 1)
pH(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pH)Á
¸pH(1 ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ ¸)pLÁ




= (¸pH(1 ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ ¸)pLÁ)
³
1 +
(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(2Á ¡ 1)
pH(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pH)Á
´
pBNr0 ¡ I =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)Á)
(¸pH(1 ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ ¸)pLÁ)(¸pH(1 ¡ pHÁ) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á)))
pGNr0 ¡ I =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))Á ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)(1 ¡ Á))




pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)Á
pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))Á ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)(1 ¡ Á)
¸pHÁ + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á)








pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)Á
pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))Á ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)(1 ¡ Á)
(¸pHÁ+
(1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á))
³
1 +
(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(2Á ¡ 1)
pH(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á) ¡ pL(1 ¡ pH)Á
´
pGNr ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))





¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH(1 ¡ ¸)pL
(pH ¡ pL + (pHpL + (1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL))(2Á ¡ 1))









The informed bank will only bid for the good, non-defaulting borrowers over
the interval [r;r0]. It will bid for good-signal, defaulting borrowers over [r0;r000],
and for bad-signal, non-defaulting borrowers over [r000;rBD].
In equilibrium, expected pro¯ts have to be constant over each of those seg-
ments.





for any r in [r;r0].
For the next interval, r 2 [r0;r000] we haveNGD(pGDr0 ¡ I)
pGNr ¡ I
pGNr0 ¡ I



























The expected pro¯ts of the informed bank can then be written as:











pBNr000 ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)Á(1 ¡ Á)(pH ¡ pL)2
(¸pH(1 ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ lambda)pLÁ)2
pGDr000 ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(Á2(1 ¡ pH) ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2(1 ¡ pL)))




Á(1 ¡ Á)(pH ¡ pL)
Á2(1 ¡ pH) ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á)




Á(1 ¡ Á)(pH ¡ pL)
Á2(1 ¡ pH) ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2(1 ¡ pL)




= (¸(1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á))
³
1 +
Á(1 ¡ Á)(pH ¡ pL)
Á2(1 ¡ pH) ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2(1 ¡ pL
´
pGDr0 ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)((1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))Á ¡ (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pHÁ)(1 ¡ Á))
(¸(1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á))(¸pH(1 ¡ pHÁ) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á)))
pGNr0 ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pH(1 ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))Á ¡ pL(1 ¡ pHÁ)(1 ¡ Á))




(1 ¡ pH)Á2 ¡ (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á)2
pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á)
¸pHÁ + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á)









¸pHÁ + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á)
pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á)









= (¸pHÁ + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á))
³
1 +
(2Á ¡ 1)((1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á))
pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á)
´
pGNr ¡ I = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á))
(¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL)(¸pHÁ + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ Á))Summing up, we get:
¼i = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
(pHÁ ¡ pL(1 ¡ Á) + (2Á ¡ 1)((1 ¡ pH)Á + (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ Á)))
¼i = I
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
(2Á ¡ 1 + 2Á(1 ¡ Á)(pH ¡ pL))
Proof of proposition 2.7



































Denote now y ´ (¸pH ¡(1¡¸)pL), x ´ (¸p2
h ¡(1¡¸)p2
l), A ´ (¸Áp2
h +(1¡
¸)(1 ¡ Á)p2
l), a ´ (¸(1 ¡ Á)p2
h + (1 ¡ ¸)Áp2
l), B ´ (¸ÁpH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ Á)pL),
b ´ (¸(1 ¡ Á)pH + (1 ¡ ¸)ÁpL).
The numerator will now be
(y ¡ xr)(Ar ¡ B) + (y ¡ xr)(ar ¡ b) = (xr ¡ y)(B ¡ Ar) + (xr ¡ y)(b ¡ ar)
Note ¯rst that b=a = rBN ¸ r, since r 2 [rN;rBN] Now observe that xr ¸
xrN > y. The last inequality is true since x
pH > y and rN > 1
pH.
Also, when Á = 0:5, it is easy to see that A = a, B = b, so that at that value
2(xr ¡ y)(b ¡ ar) ¸ 0. Finally, observe that @b
@Á = ¡y = ¡@B
@Á, @a







@' = 0, so that the non-negativity of the numerator













dÁ ¸ 0, we need to perform all the
steps identically, but denoting
y ´ (¸(1 ¡ pH) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)), x ´ (¸pH(1 ¡ pH)) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)),
A ´ (¸ÁpH(1¡pH)+(1¡¸)(1¡Á)pL(1¡pL)), a ´ (¸(1¡Á)pH(1¡pH)+(1¡
¸)ÁpL(1 ¡ pL)), B ´ (¸Á(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ pL)), and that as before,
xr ¸ xrN > y.
For the outsiders we have to show thatd
¡


































H ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L)
¡








H + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')p2
L
¢
(¸pH ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)pL)
N2
GN










¸(1 ¡ ¸)pHpL(pH ¡ pL)
N2
GN
= zn > 0
This is intuitive: the updated probability of a good signal borrower should in-
crease with the good signal precision.
By way of analogy, for history D,
@pGD
@' is calculated analogically: (observe
the di®erence between the expressions for pGD and pGN:pH is replaced by 1¡pH
p2




¸(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(pH ¡ pL)
N2
GN
= zd < 0




znrN(pGNr ¡ I) ¡ rzn(pGNrN ¡ I)
(pGNr ¡ I)2 =
znrNI ¡ rznI
(pGNr ¡ I)2 · 0
since rN · r on where F N
u is de¯ned [rN : rBN].
For D the proof is analogical with zd < 0 instead of zn > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.8


















(pGNr¡I)2 is the pdf of the uninformed bank's
bidding distribution. We can calculate its sensitivity to Á using Leibnitz's for-








































i (rBN)) = 0






































For the ¯rst one, note
d
¡



































¸(1 ¡ ¸)pHpL(pH ¡ pL)
N2
GN







zn(pGNrN ¡ I) + pGNznr
¢



















¸(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(pH ¡ pL)
N2
GN
= zd < 0
As a ¯nal step, note that the role of ' is replaced every by that of 1 ¡ ' for
the bad signal expressions.
Proof of Proposition 2.9
Remember that based on our de¯nitions of the priorsNGN = ¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
NGD = ¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
NBN = ¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL
NBD = ¸(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'(1 ¡ pL)
pGN =
¸'p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')p2
L
¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
pBN =
¸(1 ¡ ')p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)'p2
L
¸(1 ¡ ')pH + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL
pBD =
¸(1 ¡ ')pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)'(1 ¡ pL)
pGD =
¸'pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
NN = ¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
pN =
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
ND = ¸(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)
pD =
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pL)
:
and that respective interest rate is rJK = I
pJK. we ¯rst look at the incumbent's
pro¯ts.
Under information sharing
We know that the total pro¯ts of the incumbent bank are given by:
¼share = NGN(pGNrN ¡ I) + NGD(pGDrD ¡ I)
where NGN is the number of successful good-signal borrowers, NGD is the
number of defaulting good-signal borrowers, pGN is the success probability of
good-signal borrowers that have not defaulted and so on.
Plugging in the expressions for probabilities and interest rates we get the
following expression for the second-period pro¯ts with information sharing:
Assuming I = 1 (same as to divide everything by I and assuming r is now















H + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')p2
L
¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
= NGN
¸'p2




NGN(pGNrN ¡ I) =
2¸(1 ¡ ¸)pHpL(pH ¡ pL)(2' ¡ 1)
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
On the defaulting borrowers, note the similarity with non-defaulters since we
will usually use this technique: a close look will reveal that pH are changed by
(1 ¡ pH), pL by (1 ¡ pL), p2
H by pH(1 ¡ pH), p2
L are changed by pL(1 ¡ pL).
Indeed,
NGDpGD =
¸'pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL(1 ¡ pL)
¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
=
= NGD
¸'pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL(1 ¡ pL)
NGD
and that
NGN = ¸'pH + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')pL
NGD = ¸'(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ')(1 ¡ pL)
That is, by analogy
NGD(pGDrD ¡ I) =
2¸(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)(pH ¡ pL)(2' ¡ 1)
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)Therefore the sum of the two
¼share = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(2' ¡ 1)(pH ¡ pL)
h pLpH
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pH)




Plugging in the expressions for probabilities and interest rates, and going
through a series of algebraic simpli¯cations, we get the following expression for
the second-period pro¯ts with information sharing:
¼share = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(2' ¡ 1)(pH ¡ pL)
h pLpH
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pH)
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
i
:
and the gross pro¯ts without information sharing,
¼i =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
('(2(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL) + 2pLpH) + 2pH ¡ 2pHpL ¡ 1)
We have two linear, increasing functions of '. It can be shown that the slope
in the case of information sharing is higher than in the case when default infor-
mation is private information for each bank.
The slope in the case of information sharing is
@¼share
'
´ Sshare = 2¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
h pLpH
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pH)
¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL)
i
while without a credit bureau it is
Si =
¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)
¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL
(2(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL) + 2pLpH):
Sshare > Si is then equivalent to
(¸p
2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p
2
L)
2(1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pH) + (¸pH(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)pL(1 ¡ pL))
2pHpL > 0;
which is obviously true.
The intuition is that under information sharing, the outside bank knows about
the non-defaulters good payment history and is able to o®er them interest rates
in as low region, as [rN;rBN], while the same borrowers can be o®ered r at the
lowest, and competition requires that the incumbent not bid lower. This canbe seen by comparing the ¯rst terms in each expression: the denominator for
the case no sharing is rather low, ¸pH + (1 ¡ ¸)pL, which exactly the r being
high, compared to rN, which is the rate the outsider can a®ord. For the insider
therefore, there is quite a bit to win by gaining some soft information - to move
up fast, while it cannot move as fast when the success history is observed by
outsiders, and therefore he can safely begin already at the high r.
Writing now the net pro¯ts for each case we get
¼
net





i = Si' + ki ¡ c(' ¡ 0:5)
2;





c in the second. Thus the banks will choose higher monitoring
when default information is shared.
The relationship also holds in the case of constant marginal costs of infor-
mation, when it is possible that the banks choose \no monitoring" when default
information is not shared and \full monitoring" when information is shared.
Proof of Proposition 2.10




= ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(pH ¡ pL)(2Á ¡ 1)I
³ pHpL
¸p2
H + (1 ¡ ¸)p2
L
+
(1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ pL)

















H(1 ¡ pH) + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)2p2
L(1 ¡ pL)
¸2p3
H(1 ¡ pH) + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)p2
HpL(1 ¡ pL) + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)pHp2






H(1 ¡ pH) + (1 ¡ ¸)p
2
L(1 ¡ pL) + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ 2¸)p
2


























3(1 + ¸(1 ¡ 2¸))+
p
4
H(1 ¡ pH)pL(1 ¡ pL)¸




L(1 ¡ pL)¸(1 ¡ ¸)














L(1 ¡ pL)¸(1 ¡ ¸)













2(1 ¡ ¸(1 ¡ 2¸) ¡ (1 ¡ 2¸)
2) > 02 Appendix B
2.1 Dependent Variables
Source: BEEPS 2002 survey, except where other source is mentioned.
Stay. De¯nition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the ¯rm has answered
"no" to the question in the survey, 'Has your ¯rm changed its main bank (the
single bank with which your ¯rm has the closest relationship) since 1998?'. Pos-
sible answers include "yes", "no", "no main bank". (8 percent of the ¯rms report
that they have no main bank, and we exclude those ¯rms, this leaves us with a
sample of 5209 ¯rms).
React. De¯nition based on answer to the question: "Now I would like to
ask you a hypothetical question. If your ¯rm were to fall behind in its bank
repayments, which of the following would best describe how you would expect
the bank to react?" Possible answers include: 1. Extend the term of the loan
without changing the conditions(=3) 2. Extend the term of the loan but increase
the interest rate (=2) 3. Begin legal proceedings to take possession of some assets
of the ¯rm(=1).
Days. De¯nition:"How many days did it take to agree the loan with the bank
from the date of application?" The mean is 25 while standard deviation is 37.
The output is the robust OLS measure (we also do Poisson regressions, where
we have high signi¯cance in all columns).
Checking Account De¯nition: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
¯rm has answered "yes" to the question in the survey,"Does your establishment
have a checking or saving account".(source BEEPS 2005)
Caccess. De¯nition: Caccess measures access to ¯nance; higher values in-
dicate higher access to ¯nance. It equals 4, if access is reported to be of no
obstacle, 3=moderate obstacle, 2= Minor obstacle, 1=No obstacle.
Ccost. De¯nition: Ccost is cost of ¯nance; higher values indicate higher
cost of ¯nancing. It equals 4, if cost of ¯nance is reported to be of no obstacle,
3=moderate obstacle, 2= Minor obstacle, 1=No obstacle.2.2 Firm Level
Source: BEEPS 2002 survey.
Soft. Soft measures how protected the borrower is from di®erent non-¯nancial
factors. It summarizes answers to 19 questions on non ¯nancial problems of
growth. The exact question in the survey asks: Can you tell me how problematic
are these factors for the operation and growth of your business?. The factors
include skills of workers, their education, contract violations by customers and
suppliers, among others. Each of the questions is answered on a scale from 1-to 4,
where higher values stand for less obstacles (4=no obstacle, 1=major obstacle).
We take the sum of the 19 questions, and divide by 4*19. Thus, the variable
ranges from 0.25 to 1, where a value of 1 indicates that the received soft signals
about the quality of the borrower, have all been good/favorable (19 answers "no
obstacle"). We then take 1 - the value of the variable, so that higher values mean
less problems.
Management quality adds: 1 point if the manager has prior experience in
the company, 1 point if the manager is older than 40, 1 point if the manager has
higher education.
Small ¯rm. De¯nition: Dummy Variable that takes value 1 if total number
of full-time employees is less then 50. Source: s4a2.
Large (and medium) ¯rm. De¯nition: Sample of ¯rms that are not small
Source: s4a2.
Transition ¯rm. De¯nition: Firm was established in the years 19891993.
Source: s1a.
Post-transition ¯rm. De¯nition: Firm was established after 1993. Source:
s1a.
State-owned ¯rm. De¯nition: State controlled ¯rm (yes/no). Source: s2b.
Privatized ¯rm. De¯nition: privatized ¯rm (yes/no). Source: q9aa.
Sector. De¯nition: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing transport and
communication, Wholesale, retail and repairs, Real estate, renting and businessservice, Hotels and restaurants, Others. Source: q2.
2.3 Country Level
Source: Brown et al. (2007).
Information sharing. For each year between 1996 and 2004 we compute an
index for private credit bureaus and one for public credit registers: 1 point if it
exists for more than 3 years; 1 point if individuals and ¯rms are covered; 1 point
if positive and negative data are collected; 1 point if PCR/PCB distributes data
which is at least 2 years old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita GDP.
We then take the maximum of the index for credit bureaus and public credit
registers. We use 19961999 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for
the 2005 BEEPS.
Creditor rights. We use the index of creditor rights based on methodology
of La Porta et al. (1998). A score of one is assigned when each of the following
rights of secured lenders are de¯ned in laws and regulations. First, there are
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to ¯le
for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral
after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors are paid
¯rst out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt ¯rm. Fourth, if management
does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the re-
organization. We use 19962000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value
for the 2005 BEEPS.
Time to enforce payment. De¯nition: The time taken to resolve a dispute
in which a debtor defaults on a payment equal to 50% of a countrys per capita
GDP. The indicator measures the (log of the) number of days from the moment
the plainti® ¯les the lawsuit in court until the moment of actual payment. We
use 2005 value for both surveys, because earlier values are not available.
Foreign bank assets. De¯nition: The share of banking sector assets con-
trolled by banks with a majority (at least 50%) foreign ownership. We use
19962000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 2001 2003 value for the 2005 BEEPS.
Av. GDP. De¯nition: Log of per capita GDP in thousands of US dollars.
We use 19962000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for the 2005
BEEPS.In°ation. De¯nition: average annual growth rate of consumer price index
(CPI). We use 1996 2000 values for the 2002 BEEPS, and 20012003 value for the
2005 BEEPS.
Bank concentration. The fraction of deposits held by the ¯ve largest banks:
Source Barth et al 2001.
NPL. Share of non-performing loans in total loans: Source, EBRD transition
Report.
Bank reform index. A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist
banking system apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial
banks, while a score of 2 means that a country has established internal currency
convertibility and has liberalized signi¯cantly both interest rates and credit al-
location. A score of 3 means that a country has achieved substantial progress
in developing the capacity for e®ective prudential regulation and supervision,
including procedures for the resolution of bank insolvencies, and in establishing
hardened budget constraints on banks by eliminating preferential access to con-
cessionary re¯nancing from the central bank. A score of 4+ represents a level of
reform that approximates the institutional standards and norms of an industri-
alized market economy. Source, EBRD transition Report.Table 1: Means of key variables by country.
Detailed explanations of variables are given in the Variables Section of the Appendix. No Switching is a
binary indicator of not having changed the main bank since 1998. Days is the number of days the bank
needed to approve the loan of the borrower. React is an ordinal score (1 to 4), higher values indicate
more lenient reaction by the bank to a borrower's failure of payment. Caccess is cost of access (from 1
to 4) and ccost stands for capital cost (from 1 to 4); higher values indicate higher cost of and access to
¯nancing. Ch. Account is an indicator for having a checking account. Soft signal is a score indicating
soft information about non-¯nancial problems of growth.
country Mean
No Switching Days React Caccess Ccost Ch. Account Soft Signal
Albania 0.74 53.94 3.02 2.07 2.59 0.96 8.29
Armenia 0.78 24.91 2.90 2.34 2.52 0.79 11.29
Azerbaijan 0.74 21.66 2.17 2.16 2.20 0.82 12.90
Belarus 0.74 18.91 2.92 2.47 2.78 0.84 9.75
Bosnia 0.72 36.75 3.00 2.52 2.79 0.07 10.01
Bulgaria 0.70 43.69 2.97 2.80 2.88 0.93 10.17
Croatia 0.71 38.39 2.70 2.18 2.27 0.21 11.16
Czech Rep 0.88 43.22 3.03 2.45 2.53 0.99 10.68
Estonia 0.93 12.63 2.27 1.94 2.01 0.97 11.05
Georgia 0.64 23.88 2.90 2.21 2.53 0.66 9.57
Hungary 0.80 27.96 2.87 2.22 2.31 0.99 11.76
Kazakhstan 0.77 21.18 2.64 2.00 2.16 0.88 11.99
Kyrgyzstan 0.58 13.78 2.67 2.24 2.40 0.82 11.15
Latvia 0.80 17.95 2.45 1.85 2.01 0.97 10.86
Lithuania 0.77 23.63 2.54 1.62 1.99 0.99 10.61
Macedonia 0.77 33.21 2.53 2.08 2.38 0.10 10.77
Moldova 0.87 13.16 2.71 2.49 2.95 0.65 9.15
Poland 0.76 24.46 2.56 2.65 3.17 0.93 9.02
Romania 0.74 21.36 3.04 2.55 2.80 0.98 9.63
Russia 0.68 14.94 2.55 2.31 2.24 0.92 10.59
Serbia 0.56 14.30 2.67 2.43 2.78 0.09 10.43
Slovak Rep 0.75 63.22 2.95 2.50 2.58 0.99 10.04
Slovenia 0.66 24.85 2.77 1.82 2.20 1.00 12.22
Ukraine 0.69 14.79 2.77 2.44 2.62 0.94 10.08
Total 0.74 25.61 2.74 2.31 2.53 0.82 10.46
Source: BEEPS 2002, except variable checking which is BEEPS 2005.Table 2: Means of Macro-level variables by country
Information is an average information sharing index taken from Brown et al 2007, over the years 1996-
2000: the index adds 1 point if PCR/PB exists for more than 3 years; 1 point if individuals and ¯rms are
covered; 1 point if positive and negative data are collected; 1 point if PCR/PCB distributes data which
is at least 2 years old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita GDP. Foreign Bank is the share of
banking sector assets controlled by banks with a majority foreign ownership, taken over 1996-2000 , Av.
GDP is the average per capita GDP during 1996-2000, Creditor Rights is the creditor rights index based
on methodology of La Porta et al (1998),CR is the banking concentration ratio measuring the asset share
of the largest ¯ve banks, and NPL is the share of non-performing loans in total loans.
country Mean
Information Foreign Bank Av. GDP In°ation Creditor Rights CR NPL
Albania 0.00 27.10 1.20 0.10 3.00 86.70 3.75
Armenia 0.00 44.90 0.60 -0.80 2.00 54.60 1.97
Azerbaijan 0.00 4.40 0.60 1.80 3.00 71.90 2.67
Belarus 0.00 3.60 0.80 168.60 2.00 81.10 2.72
Bosnia 0.00 12.70 1.20 1.90 3.00 56.00 2.63
Bulgaria 0.80 59.10 1.60 10.30 1.50 56.50 2.39
Croatia 0.00 62.20 4.20 5.30 3.00 66.50 2.99
Czech Rep 0.00 51.90 5.50 3.90 3.00 69.00 3.68
Estonia 4.00 93.60 4.00 4.00 3.00 98.90 0.26
Georgia 0.00 16.80 0.70 4.10 2.00 57.30 1.97
Hungary 3.80 64.50 4.50 9.80 1.00 62.50 1.13
Kazakhstan 3.60 19.80 1.20 18.70 3.00 70.20 0.74
Kyrgyzstan 0.00 20.60 0.30 13.20 3.00 51.40 2.79
Latvia 0.00 74.20 3.20 2.70 3.00 66.20 1.61
Lithuania 4.60 45.90 3.30 1.00 2.00 87.90 2.38
Macedonia 2.00 32.50 1.80 6.60 3.00 72.10 3.84
Moldova 0.00 37.10 0.30 31.30 2.00 71.00 3.03
Poland 0.00 61.00 4.50 10.10 1.00 57.40 2.82
Romania 0.60 45.20 1.40 45.70 2.00 65.20 1.34
Russia 0.00 10.10 1.80 20.80 1.00 42.80 2.78
Serbia 0.00 0.50 1.00 8.80 3.00 42.40 3.33
Slovak Rep 1.20 33.40 3.70 60.40 2.00 66.50 3.27
Slovenia 2.80 10.10 9.50 12.00 2.00 69.00 2.23
Ukraine 0.00 10.80 0.60 28.20 2.00 37.00 3.48
Total 0.85 33.95 2.42 21.05 2.14 61.83 2.55
Source: BEEPS 2002.Table 3: Cross-section estimation results (Ordered-probit): Dependent variable React.
React shows banks' reaction as perceived by borrowers. it is based on the
hypothetical question, "If your ¯rm were to fall behind in its bank repayments,
which of the following would best describe how you would expect the bank
to react?" Possible answers include: a). Extend the term of the loan without
changing the conditions(=3) b). Extend the term of the loan but increase
the interest rate (=2) c). Begin legal proceedings to take possession of some
assets of the ¯rm(=1).Regressions are ordered probit. The ¯rst row is the
total sample,the second row is the sample for small ¯rms, the third one is the
sample for large ¯rms. Stars *, **, ***,indicate signi¯cance, at 10, 5, 1 percent
respectively
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 0.087*** 0.146*** 0.016
(0.030) (0.043) (0.042)
concentration 0.248 0.457 0.289
(0.299) (0.401) (0.459)
non-performing loan 0.013 0.072 -0.057
(0.042) (0.059) (0.061)
creditor rights*contract enforcement -0.046* -0.087** -0.020
(0.026) (0.036) (0.038)
foreign bank 0.991*** 1.397*** 0.406
(0.210) (0.282) (0.332)
bank reform index -0.496*** -0.688*** -0.287**
(0.086) (0.121) (0.125)
debt/asset 0.035 -0.064 0.048
(0.115) (0.170) (0.160)
post-transition -0.122* -0.220 0.018
(0.069) (0.141) (0.087)
transition -0.064 -0.130 -0.002
(0.075) (0.146) (0.097)
state owned 0.078 -0.048 0.051
(0.090) (0.199) (0.105)
GDP per capita 0.078* 0.074 0.093
(0.047) (0.063) (0.073)
in°ation -0.417*** -0.444*** -0.447***
(0.096) (0.136) (0.137)
Number of obs. 2000 1076 924
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.01Table 4: Cross-section estimation results (probit): Dependent variable checking account.
Checking account indicates the existence of checking account for the borrower.
The ¯rst row is the total sample,the second row is the sample for small ¯rms, the
third one is the sample for large ¯rms. The forth column includes an interaction
term.Stars *, **, ***,indicate signi¯cance, at 10, 5 ,1 percent respectively
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 0.287*** 0.262*** 0.402***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.045)
concentration -3.098*** -2.683*** -5.401***
(0.181) (0.204) (0.484)
non-performing loan -4.204*** -3.783*** -6.961***
(0.284) (0.314) (0.837)
creditor right*contract enforcement 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.115***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.022)
foreign bank -0.882*** -0.745*** -1.638***
(0.160) (0.180) (0.406)
bank reform index -0.210** -0.144 -0.627**
(0.103) (0.117) (0.244)
post-transition -0.063 -0.071 0.196*
(0.055) (0.069) (0.114)
transition 0.058 0.012 0.248**
(0.058) (0.072) (0.113)
state owned 0.077 -0.040 -0.003
(0.081) (0.125) (0.120)
GDP per capita 0.503*** 0.490*** 0.736***
(0.045) (0.052) (0.102)
in°ation -0.230 0.077 -2.300**
(0.459) (0.526) (1.041)
Const. 3.119*** 2.399*** 6.260***
(0.346) (0.426) (0.827)
Number of obs. 7513 5331 2182
Pseudo R-Squared 0.17 0.16 0.26Table 5: Cross-section estimation results(probit): Dependent variable Switching from the
main bank.
Switching is the dependent variable. It is a dummy that equals 1 if the ¯rm replies yes to the following question:
Has your ¯rm changed its main bank (the single bank with which your ¯rm has the closest relationship) since
1998?. Information is an index - depth of (hard)information shared by a credit register/bureau: it is 0 for
countries with no sharing. Soft is a summary measure for soft/proprietary information that is not shared by
credit bureaus. It includes answers to questions regarding 19 non¯nancial problems.It shows how protected the
borrower is from factors that may hinder operation and growth of business. Higher values of soft indicate better
soft information. Sector dummies not reported. The ¯rst column is the baseline regression on total sample.
The second column includes a third interaction term to see if small ¯rms get larger impact as soft information
improve. In both columns, all interactions are statistically signi¯cant. The third column is the regression of all
¯rms above the median value of the soft-signal variable. The forth one is all the sample, but for values of the
soft information variable that are below or equal to its median. Standard variations are clustered by country.
The ¯fth and sixth column repeat the ¯rst two columns for management quality(manager experience, skills,
education, age). Stars *, **, ***,indicate signi¯cance, at 10, 5 , 1 percent respectively.
variable (1)All (2)All (3) Good (4) Bad (5)All M (6)All M
information 0.165*** 0.157*** -0.020 0.080** 0.073* 0.083**





concentration -0.459* -0.448* -0.350 -0.713** -0.248 -0.226
(0.257) (0.258) (0.433) (0.335) (0.216) (0.216)
non-performing loan -0.258 -0.268 -1.034*** 0.257 -0.231 -0.243
(0.232) (0.232) (0.381) (0.310) (0.192) (0.192)
creditor right*enforcing contract -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.064 -0.044 -0.066*** -0.068***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.033) (0.021) (0.021)
foreign bank -0.360* -0.385** -0.477* -0.198 -0.406** -0.429***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.253) (0.290) (0.163) (0.164)
bank reform index -0.148* -0.143* -0.101 -0.204* -0.111* -0.107*
(0.076) (0.076) (0.112) (0.107) (0.063) (0.063)
debt/asset 0.213* 0.188 0.383** 0.072 0.249** 0.221**
(0.122) (0.122) (0.190) (0.159) (0.102) (0.103)
post-transition -0.159** -0.147** -0.133 -0.197** -0.207*** -0.195***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.095) (0.089) (0.055) (0.055)
transition -0.090 -0.082 -0.069 -0.122 -0.164*** -0.152**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.106) (0.099) (0.061) (0.061)
state own -0.118 -0.128 -0.064 -0.170 -0.126* -0.132**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.105) (0.118) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP per capita 0.012 0.015 0.035 0.021 -0.007 -0.007
(0.044) (0.044) (0.068) (0.058) (0.036) (0.036)
in°ation -0.204** -0.206** -0.128 -0.225** -0.132* -0.137*





Number of obs. 3668 3668 1726 1942 5144 5144
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03Table 6: Cross-section estimation results (Ordered probit): Dependent variable Cost of
capital.
Cost of capital equals 4, if cost of ¯nance is reported to be of no obsta-
cle, 3=moderate obstacle, 2= Minor obstacle, 1=No obstacle. The ¯rst
column is the regression of the total sample, the second column takes
only small ¯rms, while the third one takes large ¯rms. Stars *, **, ***
indicate signi¯cance at 10, 5, 1 percent respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3)
All Small Large
information 0.486*** 0.513*** 0.457***
(0.048) (0.059) (0.081)
information*soft -1.040*** -1.071*** -1.026***
(0.079) (0.097) (0.140)
concentration -0.004 0.069 -0.156
(0.188) (0.235) (0.321)
non-performing loan 0.397** 0.591*** 0.078
(0.171) (0.212) (0.295)
creditor right*contract enforcement -0.150*** -0.163*** -0.127***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.029)
foreign bank 0.487*** 0.698*** 0.073
(0.149) (0.180) (0.267)
bank reform index 0.097 0.094 0.111
(0.061) (0.076) (0.106)
debt/asset 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
post-transition 0.017 0.029 -0.074
(0.047) (0.074) (0.070)
transition 0.034 0.078 -0.078
(0.055) (0.082) (0.081)
state owned 0.153*** 0.102** 0.150**
(0.040) (0.052) (0.069)
GDP per capita -0.153*** -0.164*** -0.136**
(0.031) (0.039) (0.054)
in°ation 0.235*** 0.198** 0.349***
(0.067) (0.083) (0.115)
Number of obs. 3906 2581 1325
Pseudo R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.05Table 7: Panel estimation results: Dependent variable Cost of capital.
The ¯rst column is the ¯xed e®ects regression of the total sample, the second
column is random e®ects estimation. The third one takes only small ¯rms
(Fixed e®ects), while the forth one takes large and medium ¯rms (¯xed e®ects).
Stars *, **, ***,indicate signi¯cance, at 10, 5 ,1 percent respectively
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
All(FE) All (RE) Small(FE) Large(FE)
information 0.617*** 0.286** 0.255** 0.592***
(0.057) (0.127) (0.115) (0.220)
information*soft -0.061*** -0.038*** -0.047*** -0.055***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
bank reform 0.024 0.146 0.016 -0.122
(0.087) (0.310) (0.336) (0.455)
concentration -0.005*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
non performing loan -0.001 -0.014** -0.003 -0.009
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.299 1.115* -0.240
(0.047) (0.598) (0.609) (0.939)
in°ation 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
foreign bank -0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Const. 2.751*** 2.389*** 2.040** 2.935**
(0.244) (0.838) (0.866) (1.207)
Number of obs. 1843 1240 1248 595
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06